Donor’s report: On allegations of political distortions of aid in Ethiopia

By Daniel Berhane on Monday, October 3, 2011 @ 7:00 am

DAG (Development Assistance Group) published on July 2010, a study report, titled ‘Aid Management and Utilisation in Ethiopia: A study in response to allegations of distortion in donor-supported development programmes’.

DAG – Ethiopia comprises about 26 donor countries and organizations providing assistance to Ethiopia. First established in 2001 as a forum for donors to share and exchange information, DAG’s main objective of the DAG is to ensure a more effective delivery and utilization of development assistance to Ethiopia.

DAG’s members are: African Development Bank (AfDB); Austrian Embassy Development Cooperation; Belgium Embassy; Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA); Denmark Embassy; Department for International Development (DFID); European Commission; Finland Embassy; French Embassy; German Embassy – German Development Cooperation; International Monetary Fund (IMF); Indian Embassy; Irish Aid; Italian Cooperation; Japan Embassy; JICA; Netherlands Embassy; Norwegian Embassy; SIDA; Spain Embassy; Turkish International Cooperation Agency; UNDP; USAID and World Bank.

Here is the Executive Summary and the Conclusions of the report.

**************

DAG Development Assistance Group Ethiopia

Aid Management and Utilisation in Ethiopia
A study in response to allegations of distortion in donor-supported development programmes.

July 2010

******************

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development and aid in Ethiopia

Ethiopia has made impressive development progress in recent years. Since 2000, Ethiopia has recorded the second fastest improvement in human development in the world (UNDP Human Development Report). Economic growth has accelerated on a sustained basis from around 2003, despite the global economic crisis.

Significant progress is being made towards the Millennium Development Goals, with Ethiopia on track to meet Goal 1 (eradicate extreme poverty and hunger), Goal 2 (achieve universal primary education), Goal 6 (combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases) and Goal 8 (develop a global partnership for development). Good progress is also being made towards Goal 4 (reduce child mortality) and Goal 7 (ensure environmental sustainability).

External aid has played a significant role in helping to deliver this development progress and growth, saving lives and improving livelihoods. These achievements are an important measure by which donors assess the overall effectiveness of their support to Ethiopia.

Allegations of distortion in donor-supported development programmes

In January 2010, in response to allegations that some donor-supported programmes in Ethiopia were being used for political gain – with aid allocated according to political affiliation, rather than solely need – the Development Assistance Group (DAG) commissioned a study to assess the rigour of the programme systems and safeguards that are designed to ensure that aid is spent effectively.

The main allegations, reported by the Ethiopian opposition, international NGOs and the media, were that targeting of beneficiaries and recruitment of public service employees within a number of donor-supported programmes were being influenced by considerations of political affiliation; in short, that aid allocations were subject to political distortion.

The allegations referred to programmes including the Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP), the Protection of Basic Services programme (PBS), the humanitarian Relief programme, and the combined Enhanced Outreach Strategy-Targeted Supplementary Feeding programme (EOS-TSF). Development Partners provide approximately $1.5 bn per year through these programmes, delivering essential resources in support of Ethiopia’s Government-led efforts to reduce poverty.

The DAG study: Approach and findings

Development Partners have a clear responsibility to ensure that aid is spent effectively and reaches its intended beneficiaries – and will do all that is necessary in this regard. The DAG’s approach has therefore been to examine the robustness of the systems and safeguards that are in place to prevent, detect and address distortion together with available data on how effectively aid is spent and who it reaches. Further work, which could include detailed fieldwork, will be considered as part of a potential second phase.

At the same time, given the importance of external aid in a resource scarce country like Ethiopia, the DAG was keen to make sure that programmes with a track record of development impact were not thrown off course without due cause.

The Government of Ethiopia shares the responsibility for ensuring aid spent through government programmes is spent effectively and reaches its intended beneficiaries and, moreover, has the lead responsibility to investigate specific allegations through appropriate administrative and legal channels where this is justified.

The study included a thorough review of the existing systems and safeguards for each programme, and consultation with development partners, civil society and the Government of Ethiopia. The study found that all four programmes have accountability systems in place that provide checks on distortion, including distortion for political gain, but that all four programmes should be further strengthened by giving more attention to transparency (through the generation and dissemination of information), independent monitoring, and the incentives which drive performance.

The Government of Ethiopia has followed the progress of the DAG study with interest, and from the start has signalled its intent to work with Development Partners to act on any recommendations to improve the systems and safeguards in the programmes concerned, including investigating where appropriate. The DAG is now working with the Government to act on the recommendations for continued strengthening of safeguards, ultimately to maximise the developmental impact of all donor-supported programmes in Ethiopia.

Accountability systems: A summary assessment

To deliver results, to drive improved performance and to minimise the risks of distortion, development programmes must be supported by effective accountability systems that enable those responsible for implementation to be held to account, both by those that provide funding and – most importantly – by the programme’s intended beneficiaries. Ideally, programmes will be supported by effective country systems, but in practice donor-supported development programmes often make use of a combination of a country’s own systems and a series of programme-specific safeguards. Whatever approach is taken, to be effective an accountability system needs to have the following features:

• Rules, expectations and responsibilities: There are clear rules and expectations about how the programme should work and what outcomes it should deliver, with responsibilities for delivery made explicit;

• Safeguards and monitoring processes: Safeguards that prevent and detect distortion, and monitoring processes that generate reliable and timely evidence about how the programme works, what outcomes it delivers and the extent to which the various actors are meeting their responsibilities, are in place;

• Processes and mechanisms for input and challenge: Stakeholders are able to have an input into how the programme works and to challenge and hold to account those responsible for programme implementation and delivery;

• Incentives: Incentives are in place to drive behaviour and improve performance, both when programmes function as per design and when programmes are not functioning as expected.

In summary, our assessment suggests that PSNP and PBS are supported by relatively robust accountability systems. In the case of PBS – a programme that aims to support decentralised service-delivery, and whose programme-specific safeguards tend to focus on allocations to woredas – ensuring that systems at woreda and sub-woreda levels are effective and accountable is particularly important. The Relief programme and the EOS-TSF programme face important challenges in their accountability systems, in terms of safeguards and monitoring processes, and, especially for EOS-TSF, in terms of the existence of processes and mechanisms for input and challenge.

The Productive Safety Nets Programme has a well-developed accountability system in place to prevent and detect distortion, including political distortion. The challenge is to ensure that – in the face of ongoing capacity and coordination constraints – sufficient priority is given to implementing the accountability system and its safeguards at a local level. There are clear rules and guidelines which set out how the programme should work, clear responsibilities for the different organisations involved, and explicit minimum performance standards. PSNP includes a strong commitment to transparency and the public disclosure of key programme information, although implementation of this commitment is variable. A number of measures have been adopted to improve awareness, including client cards and a beneficiaries’ charter of rights and responsibilities. PSNP has a wide range of safeguards and monitoring processes in place, including financial and physical reports, evaluations, audits and independent programme evaluation, alongside parliamentary oversight. However, there are questions about whether monitoring data is put to good use by those responsible for programme implementation.

In terms of processes and mechanisms for input and challenge, community-level participatory targeting and planning is central to PSNP, and an appeals process, roving audits and beneficiary perceptions surveys have been established. There have been some concerns about reporting and record-keeping in relation to the appeals process, although these concerns – concerns that would, if well-founded, raise questions about the robustness of this element of PSNP’s supporting accountability system – are being addressed. PSNP’s performance management system should, when it is fully and effectively implemented, provide incentives to encourage good performance and identify where capacity needs to be strengthened, although it has steered clear from introducing sanctions for poor performance in particular areas. In terms of individual allegations of political distortion, the GoE has made a commitment to investigate credible allegations on a case-by-case basis.

The Protection of Basic Services programme supports and builds on Ethiopia’s own systems for accountability, and in addition has a series of safeguards at its core that help to detect and prevent distortion. The challenge for PBS – a programme that depends on effective and accountable systems at a local level – is to ensure that its efforts to strengthen financial transparency and social accountability help to reduce the risk of political distortion at woreda and sub-woreda levels. In terms of rules, there are clear formulas, approved by parliament, for allocating resources to regions and woredas, with resources aligned with government priorities at sub-woreda level. As regards information, there is a strong commitment within PBS to financial transparency, but the implementation of that commitment by local authorities is variable, and there is a lack of public awareness about how local government and service delivery is supposed to function.

In terms of safeguards and monitoring processes, four sets of safeguards – the SAFE tests – are at the core of PBS, supported by Joint Review and Implementation Support (JRIS) Missions, audits, and Interim Financial Reports. There is a dedicated monitoring and evaluation component, with monitoring feeding into Ethiopia’s Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP). As regards processes and mechanisms for input and challenge, PBS includes a strong commitment and specific component on social accountability. This aims to strengthen social accountability in a sustainable manner, building on existing government structures and systems for policy-making and participation. Progress with implementing this commitment has been slow. Finally, it is not clear what incentives are or might be applied to drive changes in behaviour and performance, although disbursements are conditional on satisfactory financial reports and donors can reduce their contributions if the SAFE tests are not met.

The Relief programme’s process for targeting is based on clear but complex rules and guidelines. However, there is a considerable need for more improvements both in terms of the overall assessment of need and the geographical allocation of resources. The introduction of two categories of need – “livelihoods” and “survival” – adds another dimension to the process. The Relief programme is well-known to the Ethiopian public, but there is a lack of clear information about how this programme and PSNP should work in places where they are both in operation, or – because of the unpredictability of Relief allocations – about people’s entitlements to Relief food.

Safeguards and monitoring processes have been established, including Post-Distribution Monitoring Surveys for World Food Programme (WFP) management purposes. However, with a lack of resources for monitoring, and in the absence of a regular programme of nutritional surveys, there are significant weaknesses in the Relief programme’s system of accountability. In terms of processes and mechanisms for input and challenge, the Relief programme is largely top-down, although there is some community involvement in food distribution, local-level targeting and management. It is not clear what incentives might be applied to respond to good or bad performance and the Government’s ability to deal with allegations of political distortion is untested, because there have been no specific allegations of political distortion substantiated through independent investigation. However, the Government has suspended payments to transporters on occasion, and donors can reduce funding, or switch their funding to other channels.

The Enhanced Outreach Strategy – Targeted Supplementary Feeding programme has clear rules about its operation, but the process that the rules are intended to govern is quite complex and requires close collaboration between ministries with responsibility for health and agriculture, and between WFP and UNICEF. The effectiveness of the programme as a whole is also heavily dependent on the quality of the screening process, a process that is vulnerable to the impact of clan ties. In terms of information and awareness, EOS-TSF makes information available to participants in its screening process in a user-friendly manner, increasing potential beneficiaries’ awareness of their rights.

As regards safeguards and monitoring processes, the screening process aims to ensure that only acutely malnourished children and women get access to supplementary feeding, but the screening process has faced a number of problems, including erroneous inclusion in 2008 and limited exclusion in 2009. Post screening coverage surveys have been established, but effective monitoring systems have not been established, in part as a result of insufficient investment. The EOS-TSF lacks processes and mechanisms for input and challenge, working in a largely top down manner and with no formal appeals process. It is not clear what incentives are or might be applied in cases of good or bad performance, although WFP can and on occasion has reduced food supplies when it has not been possible to confirm screening data, and donors can reduce their funding.

Recommendations: Investing in accountability and building country systems

Development Partners have a responsibility to ensure that the funds that they provide are spent effectively and are not subject to distortion. The development programmes to which Development Partners contribute must be supported by well-functioning accountability systems. This study has shown that each of the programmes is supported by accountability systems that provide some check on distortion, including political distortion. Nevertheless, there is room for improvement. Across the board, our analysis suggests that all four programmes should give more attention to the generation and dissemination of information, to independent monitoring, and to the incentives that are needed to drive improved performance. In terms of the four development programmes considered in this study, there are a number of specific areas for attention:

• On PSNP, there is a need to make available some clear analysis of whether targeting is effective, both in terms of which woredas are included and which kebeles within woredas are included. There is also a need to improve transparency and the public disclosure of programme information, particularly in relation to the appeals process, to ensure that the performance management system drives improvements in performance and adequately addresses cases of poor performance, and to implement the planned improvements to woreda-level monitoring through the establishment of Regional Information Centres and more frequent GoE-donor spot checks.

• On PBS, there is a need to ensure that the programme continues to strike the right balance between making use of the Government’s own systems for accountability, and using additional safeguards and systems. In addition, while the safeguards have evolved to encompass service delivery and quality as well as resource allocations, the JRIS Missions themselves should ensure that a sectoral perspective informs their analysis so that resource spending at and below woreda level remains firmly in view. To further minimise the risk of political distortion at woreda and sub-woreda levels, there is also a need to increase the momentum on financial transparency and social accountability. In addition, serious consideration should be given to re-instating a modified version of the component of the fairness test that was designed to identify distortion in allocations to woredas.

• On the Relief programme, there is a need for more monitoring, for the findings of such monitoring to be shared more widely, and for continued efforts to involve communities in the process of targeting. Monitoring needs to extend beyond the process of targeting and distribution to include monitoring of nutritional outcomes; in the absence of such monitoring it is very difficult to know how effective the programme is. There is also a need to open up the process of need assessment and resource allocation, enhancing transparency – including to intended beneficiaries – so that Development Partners and beneficiaries can have confidence that resources are allocated appropriately, according to need.

• On EOS-TSF, there is a need for more monitoring of the targeting and food distribution process and greater transparency about the findings of monitoring exercises. More attention must also be given to monitoring the impacts of the programme as a whole, and consideration given to the feasibility of establishing an appeals process. Finally, there is also a need to understand better the failings of the screening process and improve it – including through WFP’s “gatekeeper” approach. Given the central place that the screening process plays in assessing overall need, in influencing the allocation of resources to regions and woredas, and in determining which individuals are eligible to receive supplementary feeding, this is crucial.

The challenge for Development Partners – seeking to ensure that aid is effective in the short term and leads to sustainable reductions in poverty in the longer term – is to respond to donor country demands for accountability while working in ways that also enhance the accountability of partner country governments, through democratic processes, to partner country citizens. Beyond investing in programme-specific accountability systems, and working to strengthen the synergies amongst the various programmes, the appropriate response to this challenge is to invest in domestic accountability: making use of country systems; ensuring that the appropriate safeguards are in place; seeking to strengthen country systems where necessary; further investing in social accountability programmes; and, periodically reviewing how the systems and safeguards are working.

The current phase of work on aid, accountability and use of resources has identified a number of areas for improvement to the accountability systems of various donor-supported development programmes. It has also set out a useful framework for discussions amongst donors and with Government about how accountability systems might be strengthened. A second phase of work should build on this analysis, instituting a cross-programme process of lesson-learning about how the various programmes work in practice and about how the supporting accountability systems might be further strengthened. Detailed plans for a second phase of work are being discussed, but the intention is to extend the scope of the analysis to cover the Public Sector Capacity-building Programme (PSCAP) and the General Education Quality Improvement Programme (GEQIP). A second phase of work should – as far as possible – build on processes that are already in place to monitor and improve the ways in which the various programmes work. This will avoid putting further strains on programmes and ministries with already-limited capacities for effective implementation.

In pursuing this second phase of work, Development Partners should make clear that they are determined to see good progress on strengthening the accountability systems that support the programmes through which their funds are spent. If credible evidence were to come to light of widespread political distortion, or if progress on strengthening the systems and safeguards were to be slow, then Development Partners may need to review funding commitments. A determined stance on the part of donors is essential if they are to meet their responsibilities, both to taxpayers and electorates in their own countries, and to the people of Ethiopia.

Development Partners and the Government of Ethiopia will need to work together, closely and constructively, to ensure that donor-supported development programmes and their associated systems and safeguards contribute to strengthening Ethiopia’s own accountability systems. In part this is about Development Partners making use of Ethiopia’s country systems, where such systems provide sufficient guarantees that aid will be used effectively. But – given that accountability requires that individuals feel able to challenge and ask questions of those in charge of making decisions – it is also about enhancing the independence of Ethiopia’s own accountability systems so that citizens and citizens’ organisations are willing and able to demand accountability.

To drive faster progress on development, accountability should be at the centre of Development Partners’ engagement with Ethiopia, its Government and its people. In this way, addressing concerns about distortion should become part of a broader post-election dialogue about how Development Partners – providing aid in ways that promote the strengthening of domestic accountability – can work with the Government of Ethiopia to strengthen the capacity of the state to be increasingly accountable, legitimate and effective in the eyes of its citizens.

***********
7. CONCLUSIONS: INVESTING IN DOMESTIC ACCOUNTABILITY

107. Development programmes must be supported by effective accountability systems, to ensure that they deliver results, to drive improved performance and to minimise the risks of political distortion. This chapter sets out a model of the elements that an effective accountability system needs to have in place, before then providing a summary assessment of the accountability systems that are in place to support the four programmes considered as part of this study. It then makes a number of recommendations as to how Development Partners and the Government of Ethiopia might strengthen the programmes’ accountability systems and – more broadly – how Development Partners and the Government might work together to strengthen Ethiopia’s own accountability systems in order to contribute to the delivery of sustainable country-owned and led progress on poverty reduction and sustainable development.

Strengthening systems and safeguards
108. Efforts to improve the systems and safeguards in donor-supported development programmes must not be postponed until there is a universally-accepted means of identifying specifically political distortion and incontrovertible evidence of widespread political distortion. In the prevailing political context, with the allegations concerning political distortion, and the suspicion of some that the allegations may themselves be politically-motivated, that day may be some way off. Development Partners, working with the Government of Ethiopia, need to make sure that the programmes that they support are effective and are not subject to political distortion, now.

109. The Government of Ethiopia has a responsibility to investigate allegations of distortion, to create an environment in which people feel able to bring forward their complaints, to put in place effective independent mechanisms to deal with any allegations that may be made, and to ensure that donor-supported Development Programmes are implemented as designed and agreed. The GoE should ensure that local level officials understand how programmes are designed to be implemented, and are instructed and incentivised to implement them accordingly. The GoE should also reiterate – in order to make clear to administrators at local levels – that access to goods and services whose provision is supported by aid should be determined by need and not by political affiliation. However, with the allegations of political distortion levelled primarily at the GoE and the ruling party, Development Partners must remain vigilant, ensuring that the Government of Ethiopia meets its responsibilities to respond objectively and appropriately to the allegations, and insisting that effective systems to allow for independent accountability and to tackle distortion are put in place and strengthened.

Accountability systems: A model and assessment
110. Effective accountability systems drive improved performance by enabling those responsible for implementing programmes to be held to account, both by Development Partners that provide support and – most importantly – by the programme’s intended beneficiaries. Ideally, donor-supported development programmes will make use of and thereby strengthen the Government’s own systems of governance and accountability.20 In this way, donor-supported development programmes can contribute to the prospects for sustainable progress on governance and poverty reduction. In practice – including in countries where Development Partners have insufficient confidence in a country’s own systems – donor-supported development programmes often make use of a combination of the Government’s own systems and a series of programme- specific safeguards. Whatever approach is taken, to be effective an accountability system needs to have the following features:

• Information, awareness and rights: Information is made available about how the programme should work, what outcomes it should deliver and who is responsible for delivery, with intended beneficiaries aware of what they have a right to expect; • Safeguards and monitoring processes: Safeguards that prevent and detect distortion, and monitoring processes that generate reliable and timely evidence about how the programme works, what outcomes it delivers and the extent to which the various actors are meeting their responsibilities, are in place;

• Incentives: Incentives are in place to drive behaviour and improve performance, both when programmes function as per design and when programmes are not functioning as expected.

111. The Productive Safety Nets Programme has a well-developed accountability system in place to prevent and detect distortion, including political distortion. The challenge is to ensure that – in the face of ongoing capacity and coordination constraints – sufficient priority is given to implementing the accountability system and its safeguards at a local level.[21] There are clear rules and guidelines which set out how the programme should work, clear responsibilities for the different organisations involved, and explicit minimum performance standards. There is some inflexibility in relation to the geographical allocation of resources, but it is unclear whether this reduces the effectiveness of targeting. PSNP includes a strong commitment to transparency and the public disclosure of key programme information, although implementation of this commitment is variable. A number of measures have been adopted to improve awareness, including client cards and a beneficiaries’ charter of rights and responsibilities.

112. PSNP has a wide range of safeguards and monitoring processes in place, including financial and physical reports, evaluations, audits and independent programme evaluation, alongside parliamentary oversight. However, there are questions about whether monitoring data is put to good use by those responsible for programme implementation. In terms of processes and mechanisms for input and challenge, community-level participatory targeting and planning is central to PSNP, and an appeals process, roving audits and beneficiary perceptions surveys have been established. There have been some concerns about reporting and record-keeping in relation to the appeals process, although these concerns – concerns that would, if well-founded, raise questions about the robustness of this element of PSNP’s supporting accountability system – are being addressed. PSNP’s performance management system should, when it is fully implemented, provide incentives to encourage good performance and identify where capacity needs to be strengthened, although it has steered clear from introducing sanctions for poor performance in particular areas. In terms of individual allegations of political distortion, the GoE has made a commitment to investigate credible allegations on a case-by-case basis.

113. The Protection of Basic Services programme supports and builds on Ethiopia’s own systems for accountability, and in addition has a series of safeguards at its core that help to detect and prevent distortion. The challenge for PBS – a programme that depends on effective and accountable systems at a local level – is to ensure that its efforts to strengthen financial transparency and social accountability help to reduce the risk of political distortion at woreda and sub-woreda levels. In terms of rules, there are clear formulas, approved by parliament, for allocating resources to regions and woredas, with resources aligned with government priorities at sub-woreda level. As regards information, there is a strong commitment within PBS to financial transparency, but the implementation of that commitment by local authorities is variable, and – as the FTAPS survey showed – there is a lack of public awareness about how local government and service delivery is supposed to function.

114. In terms of safeguards and monitoring processes, four SAFE tests are at the core of PBS, supported by JRIS Missions, audits, and Interim Financial Reports. There is a dedicated monitoring and evaluation component, with monitoring feeding into PASDEP. However, establishing what impact PBS has had in specific sectors presents a considerable challenge. As regards processes and mechanisms for input and challenge, PBS includes a strong commitment and specific component on social accountability. This aims to strengthen social accountability in a sustainable manner, building on existing government structures and systems for policy-making and participation. Progress with implementing this commitment has been slow. Finally, it is not clear what incentives are or might be applied to motivate changes in behaviour and performance, although disbursements are conditional on satisfactory financial reports and donors can reduce their contributions if SAFE tests are not met.

115. The Relief programme’s process for targeting is based on clear but complex rules and guidelines. However, there is considerable scope for distortion both in terms of the overall assessment of need and the geographical allocation of resources. The introduction of two categories of need – “livelihoods” and “survival” – adds another dimension to the process. The Relief programme is well-known to the Ethiopian public, but there is a lack of clear information about how this programme and PSNP should work in places where they are both in operation, or – because of the unpredictability of Relief allocations – about people’s entitlements to Relief food. Safeguards and monitoring processes have been established, including Post-Distribution Monitoring Surveys for WFP management purposes. However, with a lack of resources for monitoring, and in the absence of a regular programme of nutritional surveys, there are significant challenges in the Relief programme’s system of accountability.

116. In terms of processes and mechanisms for input and challenge, the Relief programme is largely top-down, although there is some community involvement in food distribution, local-level targeting and management. It is not clear what incentives might be applied to respond to good or bad performance and the Government’s ability to deal with allegations of political distortion is untested as there have been no specific substantiated allegations of political distortion. However, the Government has suspended payments to transporters on occasion, and donors can reduce funding, or switch their funding to other channels.

117. The Enhanced Outreach Strategy – Targeted Supplementary Feeding programme has clear rules about its operation, but the process that the rules are intended to govern is quite complex and requires close collaboration between ministries with responsibility for health and agriculture, and between WFP and UNICEF. The effectiveness of the programme as a whole is also heavily-dependent on the quality of the screening process. In terms of information and awareness, EOS-TSF makes information available to participants in its screening process in a user-friendly manner, increasing potential beneficiaries’ awareness of their rights.

118. As regards safeguards and monitoring processes, the MOH/UNICEF-led screening process should ensure that only acutely malnourished children get access to supplementary feeding, but the screening process has faced a number of problems, particularly in terms of high rates of false inclusion. Post-screening coverage surveys have been established, but insufficient investments have been made in monitoring or in regularly collecting data on outcomes. And, the results of food monitoring are reportedly not shared by the Government with its partners in the programme. The EOS-TSF lacks processes and mechanisms for input and challenge, working in a largely top-down manner and with no formal appeals process. It is not clear what incentives are or might be applied in cases of good or bad performance, although WFP can and on occasion has reduced food supplies when it has not been possible to confirm screening data, and donors can reduce their funding.

119. On the basis of this assessment [22] (see figure 5; see annex 1 for a fuller summary), it would seem that PSNP and PBS are supported by relatively robust accountability systems. In the case of PBS – a programme that aims to support decentralised service-delivery, and whose programme-specific safeguards tend to focus on allocations to woredas – ensuring that systems at woreda and sub-woreda levels are effective and accountable is particularly important. For the Relief programme and the EOS-TSF programme, this assessment suggests that there are significant weaknesses in their accountability systems, in terms of safeguards and monitoring processes, and, especially for EOS-TSF, in terms of the existence of processes and mechanisms for input and challenge.

120. Across the board, our analysis suggests that all four programmes would benefit from giving greater attention to the generation and dissemination of information, to independent monitoring, and to the incentives that are needed to change behaviour and drive improvements in performance. Development Partners and the Government of Ethiopia should consider carefully how incentives and sanctions might be made smarter, so that they do not risk punishing those who are in need of assistance, but do exert influence on those actors with the power and responsibility to improve performance.

Next steps: Investing in accountability and building country systems
121. Development Partners have a responsibility to ensure that the funds that they provide are spent effectively and are not subject to political distortion. The development programmes to which Development Partners contribute must be supported by well functioning accountability systems. This study has shown that each of the programmes is supported – some more than others – by accountability systems that provide some check on distortion, including political distortion. Nevertheless, there is room for improvement in relation to all of the programmes. In terms of the four development programmes considered in this study, there are a number of specific areas for attention:

• On PSNP, there is a need – not least to dispel allegations which may be unfounded – to make available some clear analysis of whether targeting is effective, both in terms of which woredas are included and which kebeles within woredas are included. There is also a need to improve transparency and the public disclosure of programme information, particularly in relation to the appeals process, to ensure that the performance management system drives improvements in performance and adequately addresses cases of poor performance, and to implement the planned improvements to woreda-level monitoring through the establishment of Regional Information Centres and more frequent GoE-donor spot checks.

• On PBS, there is a need to ensure that the programme continues to strike the right balance between making use of the Government’s own systems for accountability, and using additional safeguards and systems. In addition, while the safeguards have evolved to encompass service delivery and quality as well as resource allocations, the JRIS Missions themselves should ensure that a sectoral perspective informs their analysis so that resource spending at and below woreda level remains firmly in view. To further minimise the risk of political and other forms of distortion at woreda and sub-woreda levels, there is also a need to increase the momentum on financial transparency and social accountability. Finally, serious consideration should be given to re-instating a modified version of the component of the fairness test that was designed to identify political distortion in allocations to woredas.

122. The challenge for Development Partners – seeking to ensure that aid is effective in the short term and leads to sustainable reductions in poverty in the longer term – is to respond to donor-country demands for accountability while working in ways that also enhance the accountability of partner country governments, through democratic processes, to partner country citizens. Beyond investing in programme-specific accountability systems, and working to strengthen the synergies amongst the various programmes, the appropriate response to this challenge is to invest in domestic accountability: making use of country systems; ensuring that the appropriate safeguards are in place; seeking to strengthen country systems where necessary; further investing in social accountability programmes; and, periodically reviewing how the systems and safeguards are working. Development Partners and the Government of Ethiopia should build on this exploratory study to advance this agenda.

123. Phase one of the DAG’s work on aid, accountability and distortion has identified a number of areas for improvement to the safeguards and accountability systems in place for various donor-supported development programmes. It has also set out a useful framework for discussions amongst donors and with Government about how accountability systems might be strengthened. A second phase of work should build on this analysis, instituting a cross-programme process of lesson-learning about how the various programmes work in practice and about how the supporting accountability systems might be further strengthened. Detailed plans for a second phase of work are being discussed, but the intention is to extend the scope of the analysis to cover PSCAP and the General Education Quality Improvement Programme (GEQIP). Given the findings of this exploratory study, the analysis conducted in phase 2 should include analysis of: the effectiveness of the targeting process in the various programmes; how the programmes generate and disseminate different sorts of information; how the programmes assess their own effectiveness and that of their targeting and resource allocation processes; the extent to which programmes make use of independent monitoring; and, what incentive systems might be put in place to drive improved performance.

124. A second phase of work should – as far as possible – build on processes that are already in place to monitor and improve the ways in which the various programmes work. This will avoid putting further strains on programmes and ministries with already limited capacities for effective implementation.

125. In pursuing this second phase of work, Development Partners should make clear that they are determined to see good progress on strengthening the accountability systems that support the programmes through which their funds are spent. If credible evidence were to come to light of widespread political distortion, or if progress on strengthening the systems and safeguards were to be slow, then Development Partners may need to review funding commitments. A determined stance on the part of donors is essential if they are to meet their responsibilities, both to taxpayers and electorates in their own countries, and to the people of Ethiopia.

126. Development Partners and the Government of Ethiopia will need to work together, closely and constructively, to ensure that donor-supported development programmes and their associated systems and safeguards contribute to strengthening Ethiopia’s own accountability systems. In part this is about Development Partners making use of Ethiopia’s country systems, where such systems provide sufficient guarantees that aid will be used effectively. But – given that accountability requires that individuals feel able to challenge and ask questions of those in charge of making decisions – it is also about enhancing the independence of Ethiopia’s own accountability systems so that citizens and citizens’ organisations are willing and able to demand accountability

127. For Development Partners, this means thinking in a more integrated manner about programmes such as the Democratic Institutions Programme that have enhancing accountability as their focus, programmes such as PSCAP and PBS that have enhancing accountability as one of their aims, and programmes such as the General Education Quality Improvement Programme (GEQIP) that are focused on other aims but which would benefit from enhanced governance and accountability. To drive faster progress on poverty reduction, accountability should be at the centre of Development Partners’ engagement with Ethiopia, its Government and its people. In this way, addressing needs for strengthening programme implementation safeguards should become part of a broader post-election dialogue about how Development Partners – providing aid in ways that promote the strengthening of domestic accountability – can work with the Government of Ethiopia to strengthen the capacity of the state to be increasingly accountable and effective in the eyes of its citizens.

Annex 1: Accountability systems – An Assessment

***********

Footnotes

Footnote 21 – The model presented above provides a framework for comparing and assessing the accountability systems that each of the four programmes has in place. Whereas the chapters on the four donor supported development programmes included in this study are intended to be descriptive accounts of the programmes, this section – while based on the evidence presented in earlier chapters – is more analytical in nature and involves judgments about the robustness and effectiveness of the accountability systems.]

Footnote 22 – In order to understand how the programmes, the systems and their safeguards work in practice it would be necessary to go beyond reviewing documentation and to gather additional evidence from the field. As such, the current study – while having made use of the best available evidence – remains exploratory.

***********************