Eritrean Showdown: Coup or Showbiz?

Yemane Gebremeskel, director of the Office of the President of Eritrea, reflected last Tuesday, on the showdown of the previous day, saying, "All is calm today as it was indeed yesterday." The well-known spin-doctor of the regime, Ali Abdu, the minister of Information, however was absent from the show this week, providing more credibility to the two months old claim that he has defected.

Calm is a relative word. But the showdown on Monday, where about 100 hundred soldiers besieged the Ministry of Information (MoI) of Eritrea and tanks rolled in the city, cannot be normal, even by Eritrean standards. Eritrea’s number of military personnel per capita is among the highest in the world.

Actually the mutineers went as far as forcing the Director of Eri-TV and Acting Minister of Information, Asmellash Abraha, to read a statement declaring the Ministry under their control and a list of demands although transmission was interrupted after he read just two of the demands.

When the satellite transmission of Eri-TV returned later in the evening, its headline news was about the heavy snowfall in Paris, France. Almost at the same time, it was learnt that the troops had returned to their barracks near the capital, Asmara, after receiving pledges from President Isaias Afeworki, who had them surrounded by his loyalists hours earlier.

Beyond these sketches, the details of the incident, its background and the politics behind it remain unclear. It is not even certain which side cut off the TV transmission on Monday.

It is difficult to shrug off the possibility that Isaias himself could be masterminding this.

He seems to be losing ground even amongst his ardent supporters that usually are heard claiming that Eritrea is engaged in a struggle against an unjust global order and Westerners who have always stood against Eritrea’s interests, as well as the belief that Ethiopia is bent on dismembering their state, very seriously.

But these can not suffice to legitimatise Isaias’s rule much longer.

The fact that his administration earned two-rounds of United Nations sanctions, and condemnations even by the African Union (AU), which hardly take a stand against its members, have cast doubt on his stature as a ‘genius’. The thousands of youth that cross the Eritrean border every month seeking refuge in neighbouring countries is an indicator of his dwindling public approval rating.

He certainly needs to improve the way that he does things. This could entail minimalistic measures, like, dismantling the high-profile structure profiting from smuggling youth across the border or restructuring ruling party companies to raise the payment for youth forced to work under the pretext of national service. It could also mean bigger things, like, demoting top civilian and political officials to pave the way for his hand-picked successor or starting a peace talk with Ethiopia without pre-conditions, or all at the same time.

For such drastic changes, he needs justification. And, the bigger the crisis, the freer his hands would be.

However, the implication of Monday’s showdown appears too big to be to the liking of the control-freak president who relentlessly demonstrates his invincibility with sudden appearances at public places. The fact that the solidiers demanded the implementation of the 1997 Draft Constitution and the release of political prisoners goes beyond what is needed to achieve the above-stated objectives.

Their act by itself sets a dangerous precedent in a country where the army is disgruntled with a virtually permanent life in the barracks with meager provisions. Thus, given the strain the incident left on the stature of the government, even if it turns out to be a drama of Isaias’ making, it indicates the presence of a bigger crisis that persuaded Isaias to bet on this one.

In fact, a series of events in the past months indicate a serious problem may be unfolding. The defection of two pilots to Saudi Arabia flying the presidential plane and that of his right-hand minister, Ali Abdu, are noteworthy in this term.

The claim that Isaias intends to stand down soon, which appeared on an Asmara affiliated media outlet a few months ago, indicates that the president-for-life has somewhat felt the need to make such leaks. The recent move to arm urban-dwelling civilians, under the pretext of them being reserves, can be taken as a move to dilute the army’s monopoly of violence. These things give some credence to the claim that demands for some reforms-of-sorts have been made by some officers in the Eritrean army, which has become the lone centre of power since the purging of the big wigs of the ruling party a decade ago.

However, not many wish to call the Monday showdown an attempted coup d’état. Eritrean activists, wary of international opinion, frown even on the use of the term mini coup d’état and laboured to downplay reports of injured and missing army officials as a consequence of Monday’s showdown. Moreover, the mutineers’ demand were minimalist, falling short of asking Isaias to resign, though some claim that was also somewhere down the list of their demands.

Others, like,  Leonard Vincent, an expert on Eritrea, insist on the word coup de force, as the showdown appears to be aimed at showing what the army would do, lest Isaias resumes negotiations for political transition and continues to drag his feet on the implementations.

Perhaps, the widely used word "negotiation" is a misnomer, as it portrays the army as an institution having some sort of independence from Isaias’ Office. To the contrary, Isaias works to undermine the hierarchy and authority of military chiefs by intervening in operational and administrative matters and, more importantly, by dealing directly with their deputies.

Bypassing, sometimes sidelining, the high-ranking officers is not only a result of Isaias’ disregard for formal structures, but also intended to keep the loci of power fluid. This includes constantly rotating  the placement of army units and reshuffling chiefs. These maneuvers, coupled with the crony and bitter rivalry among top commanders that Isaias engineered, certainly precluded potential threats for the last decade, when Eritrea for all practical reasons, became a military dictatorship. In fact, Isaias managed to create a system where no one can tell who the second-in-command is.

As Isaias mistrusts his top officials and advisers, and is presumably disappointed in how they fail to grasp his grand ideas and designs, he would naturally resort to the mid-level officials, where he has an iconic status. Inviting them into meetings and letting them present recommendations is not only a way of undermining the military’s chain of command, thus preempting potential threats, but also cementing his image as an altruistic r
eal son of the state, crippled by incompetent top leadership.

The drawback of this approach, however, is that, through time, it saws the seed for mutiny. It emboldens the mid-ranking officials to see themselves as darlings of Isaias and, thus, hold free discussions on political issues in their camps and bars.

Why the youth cross borders en-masse, evading conscriptions, was allegedly one of Isaias’ favourite talking point with the mid-ranking officers. Unlike his advisors, however, these officers have less incentives to concur with him blaming the youth and far-fetched theories of grand conspiracy. In fact, they would think their iconic leader needed some insights to make things better. But it would only be a matter of time before they started doubting his competence or sincerity or both.

One cannot help but ponder a possible resemblance with the 1974 Ethiopia, where Emperor Haileselassie downplayed the threat coming from mid-ranking officers who dared to organise themselves and make demands in three rounds. The demands ultimately, albeit hesitantly, evolved into ousting the Emperor only after the army usurped all state institutions.

Like the Emperor, Isaias barely trusts his advisers who presumably provide him with contradicting recommendations, either to please him or to sabotage one of their peers. Thus, Isaias, apparently, cast his lot with the lower officers who are too small to pose a threat.

Thus, he would naturally snub reports of frequent mid-level officers’ gatherings and disappointments with his rule. Such reports would be suspected of being exaggerated by senior officials who wish to reassert their authority.

Just like the Emperor, it is likely that Isaias would insist if the mid-level and lower officers ever resort into mutiny, it would be because of mal-administration by their superiors. Unsurprisingly, this was the line used by the pro-Asmara journalist Thomas Mountain to spin the Monday showdown.

Alike Haileselassie’s final days, Isaias is now frequently ill, alone and too old to act swiftly, not to mention his frequenting of bars, where he allegedly was when the Monday showdown unfolded. Thus, he might have failed to preempt the Monday showdown being unsure where he should strike to turn the tide in his favor.

Moreover, paralysis by analysis – not reacting to events for which he does not have a certain way out – is Isaias’ way of doing things. The achievements on his resume are mostly results of waiting passively until things turn in his favour.

But, may be, this time around, he waited too long. But, still, may be, he did not.

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* Originally published on Daniel Berhane’s weekly column "Capital Insight" on Addis-Fortune on January 27, 2013.