Three leaked Cables US Embassy Addis Ababa, dated July 15, 2009 and classified as ‘Confidential, present an interesting analysis of the influence of Wahabi in the Ethiopian Muslim community and a strategy to counter it. [These are in addition to the two Cables of 2008 previously posted in this blog.]
The three Cables, titled, ‘Growing Wahabi Influence in Ethiopia – Amhara Region and the "Jama Negus Mosque" ’, ‘Wahabism in Ethiopia as "Cultural Imperialism" ‘, and ‘Countering Wahabi Influence in Ethiopia Through Cultural Programming’ discuss the issues pertaining to the Wahabi movement at length.
Though not everything in a US Embassy Cable is necessarily correct, given the significance of the issue it deserves to be read and deliberated upon.
Some of the interesting remarks in the Cables are:
* During the 8-hour drive to Dessie, the official pointed out numerous ‘cookie cutter’ mosques that were built by Kuwaiti NGOs over the past ten years. Each one, he said, cost about USD 30,000 to build and over 150 have been built to date from the Dessie area north to Tigray region. Easily spotted, each one is green, one-story, with a square minaret. While attractive and fitting in with the local landscape (unlike the steel-and-glass mosques built in other areas), these were clearly distinguishable from the more traditional Ethiopian mosques.
* That same Council member also told PAO how Wahabi NGOs are laundering money to support their operations in Ethiopia. Large numbers of Ethiopians work in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries as domestics, laborers, and other unskilled occupations, as well as in better paying skilled jobs………The operative then buys appliances or other durable goods with cash that are then smuggled into Ethiopia through Somalia or Djibouti, sold on the open market without taxes (but at a substantial mark-up that is still below the going market rate), with the profits accruing to a Wahabi NGO.
* Islam has existed in Ethiopia since the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the mainly Sufi Muslim community has enjoyed traditions, customs, and cultural practices that have endured for centuries. Yet this indigenous Muslim culture has come under attack since 9/11 by Wahabi missionaries engaging in what amounts to ‘cultural imperialism’ against Ethiopian Islam. Prior to 9/11, there was little Wahabi proselytizing in Ethiopia.
* Wahabi missionaries are able to use their money and ‘legitimacy’ as native speakers of the language of the Koran and their closeness to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, to undermine Ethiopian Muslim customs and traditions and teach interpretations of the Koran that promote a far less tolerant view of other Muslims and non-Muslims alike..
* Ethiopian Muslims, in particular, can easily see that Arab cultural imperialism under the guise of Wahabi missionaries threatens their centuries-old faith traditions and sends a message of inferiority to the Muslim faithful. That message of inferiority is that African Muslim traditions (particularly Sufi) are ‘unislamic,’ that Africans who have been practicing Islam for more than a thousand years have ‘strayed form the Truth,’ and that they need to purge their culture and traditions of practices and rituals that do not conform to their Arab/Saudi/Wahabi ideal.
* Prior to 9/11, Wahabis were hardly active in Ethiopia. Since that time, though, they have greatly increased their work in Ethiopia, working through NGOs and Ethiopian Muslims who lived and worked or studied in Saudi Arabia and became Wahabis themselves. Early on, they set themselves up in direct competition with the Islamic Affairs Supreme Council (IASC) as being the only legitimate Muslim authority in Ethiopia. Although the IASC initially tried to accommodate the Wahabis, they quickly realized there was no compromising with them and cleaned house in the last IASC election earlier this year.
* In the Bale district of Ethiopia (southeastern Oromiya region near Somalia), in the area around the Sheikh Hussein Shrine, Wahabis destroyed more than thirty Sufi shrines in the first few years after 9/11. In doing so, they turned public opinion against them and met considerable resistance from the local population. No more monuments have been vandalized or destroyed in the past three or four years, but Wahabi activists continue to preach and teach against the practice of saints, shrines and pilgrimages ) especially to the Sheikh Hussein Shrine, which has been a pilgrimage destination for Ethiopian Muslims for over 400 years.
* In Dessie, in the Amhara region (northern part of the country), Wahabis are on the offensive against the practice of celebrating Moulid al-Nebi, the Birthday of the Prophet. With support from Kuwaiti religious NGOs, Wahabi activists actively preach and teach against this practice, which has been a popular custom in the larger region for some 200 years.
* In Harar city and the Harar region, Wahabis went to great lengths to make inroads into this historic center of Ethiopian Islam (Muslim since the time of the Prophet and considered by many to be the ‘Fourth Holy City of Islam’), but strong resistance by the populace and their leaders effectively drove them out. In the larger Harar region, Wahabis in the past tried to evangelize the population, but the people in this heavily Sufi area roundly rejected Wahabism to the point that Wahabi missionaries finally gave up and left.
* Ethiopian Muslims, by and large, are Sufis. As Sufis, the Muslim communities across Ethiopia have developed local customs and traditions of saints, zikrs (communal prayer chants), and pilgrimages, and Ethiopian Muslim writers have compiled a significant body of literature on Islam, Islamic law, and Muslim spirituality. With the advent of Wahabism in Ethiopia, these practices have come under widespread assault…
* Given the nature of Wahabi attacks on the Ethiopian Muslim community, the picture is becoming increasingly clear through discussions with Muslim intellectuals and religious leaders that this is, in fact, ‘cultural imperialism’ by Arab/Wahabi missionaries against Ethiopian/African Muslims. Wahabi missionaries to not seek to convert Christians or non-Muslims, but instead focus all their efforts on other Muslims only. In seeking to ‘purify Islam’ among the larger Muslim community, Wahabis are in fact trying to develop a globalized version of the Faith that does not reflect the rich diversity of Muslim communities and their faith traditions around the world.
* The fact that foreign Wahabi missionaries do not seek to convert non-Muslims, but instead focus exclusively on the indigenous Muslim community, shows that they are in fact trying to change the Muslim culture of Ethiopia by questioning their values (e.g., tolerance of Christians and other non-Muslims, as well as other Muslim groups), their customs (e.g., pilgrimages to saints, shrines), their traditions (e.g., Moulids), their style of dress (e.g., black Wahabi veils that cover the face instead of the open, brightly-colored veils typically worn by Muslim women in Ethiopia), and even the writings of Ethiopian Muslim thinkers whose views do not conform with Wahabi interpretations.
* By recognizing this movement as an aspect of cultural imperialism, it becomes clearer how to develop an effective strategy to counter this influence.
COUNTERING WAHABI INFLUENCE IN ETHIOPIA THROUGH CULTURAL PROGRAMMING
* This ‘cultural imperialism’ can be countered through cultural programming that focuses on places, objects, and traditions as they relate to indigenous Muslim communities. Similarly, it is important to help local Muslim leaders resist these external forces intellectually by providing materials written by Muslim authors that support a more orthodox interpretation of Islam in local languages.
* This strategy is three-pronged, centered on places, objects, and traditions. In any situation where an indigenous culture is being threatened by external cultural influences, cultural pride (or lack thereof) can be the determining factor as to whether the indigenous culture loses the battle. In the case of Ethiopian Islam, there is great cultural pride in Ethiopia’s Islamic history and Muslim faith and practices, so it is vital to reinforce that pride and assist the local culture in asserting itself in the face of these foreign influences.
* [Jama Negus Mosque] is illustrative of how cultural programming can counter Wahabi influence. As the first place in Ethiopia where the Birthday of the Prophet was celebrated, the site today is a center of moderate, Sufi, Ethiopian Muslim life…….Arab (e.g., Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Qatari) NGOs active in Ethiopia have refused to provide any assistance to supporters of the Jama Negus Mosque, in spite of requests from Muslim leaders in the region and the activity of those NGOs in supporting new mosque construction throughout the area.
* These NGOs are almost exclusively Wahabi in orientation. This repeats a pattern already demonstrated in the Bale and Harar regions where it was only U.S. support (through the AFCP and PAS grants) that helped Ethiopian Muslims to preserve their historic shrines and manuscripts.
* Unlike Christian manuscripts, Muslim manuscripts are in great danger and their loss to Ethiopia removes them completely from their historical context. There are several reasons for this. First, Islamic manuscripts are almost exclusively written on paper as Harar was a great trade center in centuries past and paper could be easily purchased from India and the Orient. Christian manuscripts, on the other hand, are almost always written on skins, which are much more durable than paper and do not break down nearly as fast as paper does. Christian manuscripts are also written in Ge’ez or Amharic, so no matter where they end up in the world, it is obvious they were produced in Ethiopia. Muslim manuscripts, though, are almost exclusively written in Arabic, so once removed from Ethiopia, their provenance is almost always unknown and it is no longer clear that they were produced in Ethiopia ) especially when the author’s name is recorded and it is an Arabic name, as most Muslim names in Ethiopia are.
* Where this becomes a real cultural issue is when Ethiopian Muslim writers with Arabic names write books on Islamic law, Muslim traditions, Sufi holy men and women, etc., and the books are removed form the country and collected/studied abroad. When this happens, it may not be at all clear that the author was an Ethiopian or that the book was produced as part of a Harari school of Islamic thought. As a result, Ethiopia’s historical status in the larger Muslim world is reduced and knowledge of ‘African Islam’ is reduced.
* As part of a broad Faith Communities Outreach strategy, cultural programming can contribute significantly to the achievement of foreign policy objectives. In the case of Ethiopia, these include stability, co-existence of Muslim and Christian communities, rejection of Islamic extremists by the population, and a firm stance from Ethiopian Muslim leaders that rejects Salafist teachings and practices. While no one will argue that all Wahabis are Salafists, there is clearly a link between the growth in Salafism and the spread of Wahabism by foreign missionaries and Arab NGOs. Ethiopian Muslim traditions, as in most African countries where Islam has been a factor, are mainly derived from Sufi faith traditions. With an emphasis on tolerance and mutual respect for ‘the People of the Book’ (Jews, Christians, and Muslims), a stress on internal (not external ) Jihad, and customs and practices that often seem to mimic Christian practices, many Sufi traditions come under direct assault from Wahabi activists who see them as an impediment to the imposition of Wahabism in areas of strategic interest to them.
* Cultural programs that strengthen the indigenous Muslim community against foreign encroachment ultimately help to preserve the delicate balance between faith communities that has developed over the centuries, especially in Africa. Doing so also demonstrates to the rest of the world that a great religion such as Islam can come in many ‘flavors’ and that every culture can adapt itself to Islam while adapting Islam to itself without corrupting the essential core beliefs of the Faith. There is not one version of Islam that applies to all, but rather it is a faith rich in diversity and all forms of it should be respected ) not just one.
* When well-considered and executed creatively, cultural programming can make a real difference in turning back Islamic extremism and turning public opinion against activists who seek to overturn the existing order and import a brand of Islam that breeds conflict through its corrosive teachings that run counter to more orthodox interpretations of the Koran.
Read the full text of the three Cables below.
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Reference ID – 09ADDISABABA1672
Created – 2009-07-15 13:37
Released – 2011-08-30 01:44
Classification – CONFIDENTIAL
Origin – Embassy Addis Ababa
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001672
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TAGS: KPAO KISL KIRF SCUL PROP ET
SUBJECT: GROWING WAHABI INFLUENCE IN ETHIOPIA – AMHARA REGION AND THE "JAMA NEGUS MOSQUE"
REF: 08 ADDIS ABABA 3230
Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto. Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D
FIRST OF THREE CABLES ON COUNTERING WAHABI INFLUENCE IN ETHIOPIA
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SUMMARY
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¶1. (C) PAO visited Dessie, in Wello province of the Amhara Region, June 3-5, to visit the Jama Negus Mosque, which is a site for a potential Ambassador’s Fund for Cultural Preservation (AFCP) grant proposal for FY-10. A major Sufi shrine, the mosque is the focal point of the ‘Moulid al-Nebi’ (‘Birthday of the Prophet’) celebrations each year in which more than 100,000 people converge on the hills surrounding the mosque to celebrate this high holy day. As Wahabism does not recognize moulids as being ‘Islamic’, encroaching Wahabism in the area has led to conflicts with the local community over these celebrations. With over 150 mosques built in the region by Kuwaiti NGOs in the past ten years, pressure to curtail popular (mainly Sufi) celebrations of the faith, and Wahabi-style veils increasingly common throughout the countryside, the Ethiopian Muslim community in the area is under growing cultural and religious pressure to adopt Wahabi ways. END SUMMARY.
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KUWAITI MOSQUES AND SAUDI VEILS DOT THE COUNTRYSIDE
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¶2. (C) In the wake of two AFCP projects in Ethiopia specifically targeted to the Muslim community (FY-06 Sheikh Hussein Shrine in the Bale Region and FY-09 Teferi Mekonnen Palace in Harar), the Islamic Affairs Supreme Council (IASC) approached the Embassy about a restoration/conservation project for the Jama Negus Mosque in Dessie, about 400 km north of Addis Ababa in the Wello province of Amhara Region. PAO visited the mosque with a LES and a Muslim official from the area. During the 8-hour drive to Dessie, the official pointed out numerous ‘cookie cutter’ mosques that were built by Kuwaiti NGOs over the past ten years. Each one, he said, cost about USD 30,000 to build and over 150 have been built to date from the Dessie area north to Tigray region. Easily spotted, each one is green, one-story, with a square minaret. While attractive and fitting in with the local landscape (unlike the steel-and-glass mosques built in other areas), these were clearly distinguishable from the more traditional Ethiopian mosques.
¶3. (U) At the same time, many women were seen throughout the villages wearing the traditional Wahabi-style face veil that was not seen in Ethiopia until recent years. Although no men were seen sporting the ‘Wahabi beard,’ the number of veiled women was very high. In fact, the IASC representative who accompanied us said that they estimate about 40% of the people in that region are now Wahabis. Women of all economic classes were seen wearing the veil, from the poorest wood carriers bent double under their load of wood in the hot sun or working in the fields, to wealthier women in cars and on horseback.
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OVERVIEW OF THE MOSQUE AND THE PROPOSED PROJECT
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¶4. (U) The mosque itself is situated on a high hill, about 40 km and 2.5 hours by SUV from Dessie. The site centers on the tomb of Mujahid, an early Muslim ‘saint’ who introduced the celebration of the Prophet’s Birthday to the area. In the ensuing 200 years since Mujahid died, this mosque has become the focal point of moulid celebrations in Ethiopia, attracting large numbers of people to the three-day celebrations. Our source said the number of people who come each year is over one hundred thousand, a number that was easy to believe when he pointed out all the hills around the mosque that are covered with tents and people sleeping in the open air during the celebrations. The number is so great, he said, that the faithful have to rotate through the site in shifts in order to accommodate the large number of people who come mostly by foot from long distances to reach the site.
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¶5. (U) The mosque complex is built around the tomb of Said Mujahidin, who was born in 1744 in Wello, in the village of Dure. Local tradition has it that Mujahidin successfully completed his Islamic education and founded the site in order to celebrate the Moulid al-Nebi, the Birthday of the Prophet. He organized the first celebration of this Moulid in 1764 when he was just 20 years old. This makes the age of the site to be 245 years old. Recognized early on as an important Sufi teacher in his region, Mujahid’s celebrations of the Moulid grew in importance as Muslims from throughout the area and beyond began to make his mosque a pilgrimage destination, much like the Sheikh Hussein Shrine in Bale. The site has thus become a center for the expression of Ethiopia’s indigenous Muslim/Sufi culture and a ‘hot spot’ for Wahabi influence in the region.
¶6. (U) Architecturally, the structures on the site are not that old. Although Mujahid died in 1807, at the age of 63, the building that shelters his tomb (and the tombs of his family) was built by the Italians in the late 1930s. The current mosque, a simple wattle and mud structure, is about 35 years old. This simple structure has been rebuilt a number of times over the years and is not important architecturally, but the site itself is of spiritual significance.
¶7. (C) The importance of the site, however, lies in its status as the first place where Ethiopian Muslims celebrated the Moulid al-Nebi, one of the most important celebrations for Ethiopia’s largely Sufi Muslim community. After the local Islamic Affairs Council was repeatedly turned down by Arab NGOs to repair and preserve the site, the council turned to the Embassy for support in the wake of the AFCP grant for the Sheikh Hussein Shrine that has just been completed months before. In doing so, the Council representative pointed out how support for this project will be seen not just by Muslims in the Dessie area, but will be known across Ethiopia because of the large numbers of pilgrims who visit the shrine every year. Embassy likewise believes it is in the U.S. national interest to support this project and will work with the council in FY-10 to submit an AFCP grant proposal.
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IASC’S GROWING CONCERN ABOUT WAHABIS
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¶8. (C) In the meantime, the IASC continues to be very concerned about growing Wahabi influence in Ethiopia. The newly appointed Council is decidedly anti-Wahabi and speaks openly of their concern about Wahabi missionaries and their destabilizing influence in Ethiopia. In a recent meeting with PAO, the Council Vice-President asked that the USG undertake a special effort to provide schools for pastoralist children in Afar, Somali, and Gambella regions because the people are generally uneducated and children end up getting their education only from small madrassas that are propagating Wahabi thought to children of all ages. Providing small schools, he said, would help these communities to become more settled and would undercut Wahabi missionaries who are currently making significant inroads into those communities.
¶9. (C) That same Council member also told PAO how Wahabi NGOs are laundering money to support their operations in Ethiopia. Large numbers of Ethiopians work in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries as domestics, laborers, and other unskilled occupations, as well as in better paying skilled jobs. Many of these people send money home through the ‘Hawala’ system, whereby money is paid to an operative in the Arab countries and money is then paid out in Ethiopia to family members. There are low or no fees for this service, thus enabling the Ethiopian to send more money home than he/she would be able to do through Western Union or commercial bank transfers. The operative then buys appliances or other durable goods with cash that are then smuggled into Ethiopia through Somalia or Djibouti, sold on the open market without taxes (but at a substantial mark-up that is still below the going market rate), with the profits accruing to a Wahabi NGO. Through this mechanism, the NGO leaves no financial trail that can be followed by the GoE as everything was handled in cash. Ethiopian Muslims are thus able to send more money home to their families and Wahabi NGOs increase funding that cannot be tracked through the financial system.
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¶10. (C) As a result of Wahabi activism in Ethiopia, conflicts have arisen at several universities between Muslims and Christians as Wahabi activists seek to establish first ‘prayer rooms’ and then mosques on campuses. Conflicts within the Muslim community have also arisen over control of mosques, which imams should be allowed to preach, and over control of Islamic education. The IASC wants to build an Ethiopian Muslim theological school so that young Ethiopian men will not have to go to the Middle East to study in preparation for becoming Imams, as they must now. These young men are increasingly studying in Saudi Arabia due to the generous scholarships and subsidies available there, and when they return to Ethiopia to take up their posts in new Saudi-funded mosques, they continue to receive subsidies from Saudi Arabia or Islamic NGOs. Unfortunately, the Sufi-dominated Muslim community in Ethiopia does not have sufficient funds to start their own theological school, nor can they counter the financial advantage Wahabis have in Ethiopia.
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WHY SHOULD THE U.S. CARE ABOUT WAHABISM IN ETHIOPIA?
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¶11. (U) As a result of traditional Sufi tolerance, and Ethiopia’s long history of significant Muslim, Christian, and Jewish co-existence, a very real culture of tolerance and mutual respect between the faith communities has developed over the centuries. This development was also helped by the presence of a sizable Jewish community in Ethiopia that long pre-dated the advent of Christianity in the Horn of Africa. In spite of occasional inter-communal conflicts, the Ethiopian record of inter-faith co-existence remains quite good. Both Muslim and Christian leaders speak out often and forcefully of the need to respect the other faith, to have peace between the communities, and otherwise to teach tolerance and mutual understanding by example and not just by words.
¶12. (C) With the advent of Wahabism in Ethiopia, however, this delicate balance is in danger of being upset. Conflicts have begun first within the Muslim community, but have also begun to spread out to include Christian groups as Wahabis seek to assert themselves on college campuses and in smaller towns outside the capital. The threat of inter-communal conflict in Ethiopia between Muslims and Christians, as well as between Muslims themselves, can only give a foothold and operating space to Salafist and extremist groups that might seek to exploit the situation.
¶13. (C) In a shift from past practice, the IASC is now completely purged of Wahabi members. In a luncheon with PAO and the CJTF-HOA Chaplain, the Council members acknowledged that the Council is now all Sufi and in their public statements they repeatedly make reference to Ethiopia’s tradition of religious tolerance and co-existence with the Christian communities. As the Ethiopian government appoints the members of the Islamic Council, it is clear that the GoE shares this concern about growing Wahabi influence and is supporting moderate Muslim leaders in trying to counter that influence.
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CONCLUSION
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¶14. (C) Although Wahabi influence continues to grow in Ethiopia, there are signs that many Ethiopians resent their presence and want to engage them actively in a real debate for the hearts and minds of the Ethiopian Muslim community. In fact, there is a growing perception that they are victims of ‘Arab Cultural Imperialism’ and want to fight back against this threat to their own indigenous cultural traditions. They cannot do it on their own, however, but need help to counter the money and infrastructure that Wahabi NGOs bring to this fight. Post believes there are ways to counter this growing influence through aggressive cultural programming, as will be outlined in the second and third parts of this series.
YAMAMOTO
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Reference ID – 09ADDISABABA1674
Created – 2009-07-15 13:40
Released 2011-08-30 01:44
Classification – CONFIDENTIAL
Origin – Embassy Addis Ababa
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001674
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2019
TAGS: KPAO KISL KIRF SCUL PROP ET
SUBJECT: WAHABISM IN ETHIOPIA AS "CULTURAL IMPERIALISM"
REF: 08 ADDIS ABABA 3230
Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
SECOND OF THREE CABLES ON COUNTERING WAHABI INFLUENCE IN ETHIOPIA
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SUMMARY
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¶1. (C) Arab Wahabi missionaries, mainly from Saudi Arabia, continue to make inroads into the Ethiopian Muslim community, but are meeting increasing resistance in doing so. Islam has existed in Ethiopia since the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the mainly Sufi Muslim community has enjoyed traditions, customs, and cultural practices that have endured for centuries. Yet this indigenous Muslim culture has come under attack since 9/11 by Wahabi missionaries engaging in what amounts to ‘cultural imperialism’ against Ethiopian Islam. Prior to 9/11, there was little Wahabi proselytizing in Ethiopia. As a result, Ethiopia’s delicate Muslim/Christian balance and historic attitudes between the faith communities regarding tolerance and mutual respect are being challenged, thereby undermining U.S. interests in the region. Sufi Muslim leaders want support from the U.S. to counter this pressure. END SUMMARY.
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WAHABIS CHALLENGE ETHIOPIAN MUSLIMS
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¶2. (C) In the Harar, Bale, and Dessie regions of Ethiopia, Arab Wahabi missionaries (and their Ethiopian disciples) are directly challenging the traditions and practices of the indigenous Muslim community. As expressed to PAO by members of the IASC, Wahabi missionaries are able to use their money and ‘legitimacy’ as native speakers of the language of the Koran and their closeness to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, to undermine Ethiopian Muslim customs and traditions and teach interpretations of the Koran that promote a far less tolerant view of other Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Because of the financial support these missionaries have, it is very difficult for Ethiopian Muslim leaders to counter their influence and many imams are not educated well enough to argue against these foreign interlocutors. As a result, indigenous Ethiopian Muslim culture is under assault and the Ethiopian Muslim community needs U.S. support to counter extremist influence that may well generate and promote conflicts with the Ethiopian Christian community as well as intra-Muslim conflicts as we have already seen happen in some areas.
¶3. (C) Ethiopians are sensitive to this issue and readily understand the nature of this conflict when it is put in ‘cultural imperialism’ terms. ‘Cultural imperialism’ and ‘globalization’ are terms that resonate with Africans across the continent. Ethiopian Muslims, in particular, can easily see that Arab cultural imperialism under the guise of Wahabi missionaries threatens their centuries-old faith traditions and sends a message of inferiority to the Muslim faithful. That message of inferiority is that African Muslim traditions (particularly Sufi) are ‘unislamic,’ that Africans who have been practicing Islam for more than a thousand years have ‘strayed form the Truth,’ and that they need to purge their culture and traditions of practices and rituals that do not conform to their Arab/Saudi/Wahabi ideal.
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WAHABI ACTIVISM IN ETHIOPIA SINCE 9/11
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¶4. (C) Since 9/11, according to post’s interlocutors, Wahabi missionaries have increased their activity in Ethiopia greatly. Prior to 9/11, Wahabis were hardly active in Ethiopia. Since that time, though, they have greatly increased their work in Ethiopia, working through NGOs and Ethiopian Muslims who lived and worked or studied in Saudi Arabia and became Wahabis themselves. Early on, they set themselves up in direct competition with the Islamic Affairs Supreme Council (IASC) as being the only legitimate Muslim authority in Ethiopia. Although the IASC initially tried to accommodate the Wahabis, they quickly realized there was no compromising with them and cleaned house in the last IASC
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election earlier this year. Now the IASC is all Sufi and they are reaching out to the U.S. and other potential partners to help them counter Wahabi influence.
¶5. (C) In the Bale district of Ethiopia (southeastern Oromiya region near Somalia), in the area around the Sheikh Hussein Shrine, Wahabis destroyed more than thirty Sufi shrines in the first few years after 9/11. In doing so, they turned public opinion against them and met considerable resistance from the local population. No more monuments have been vandalized or destroyed in the past three or four years, but Wahabi activists continue to preach and teach against the practice of saints, shrines and pilgrimages ) especially to the Sheikh Hussein Shrine, which has been a pilgrimage destination for Ethiopian Muslims for over 400 years.
¶6. (C) In Dessie, in the Amhara region (northern part of the country), Wahabis are on the offensive against the practice of celebrating Moulid al-Nebi, the Birthday of the Prophet. With support from Kuwaiti religious NGOs, Wahabi activists actively preach and teach against this practice, which has been a popular custom in the larger region for some 200 years.
¶7. (C) In Harar city and the Harar region, Wahabis went to great lengths to make inroads into this historic center of Ethiopian Islam (Muslim since the time of the Prophet and considered by many to be the ‘Fourth Holy City of Islam’), but strong resistance by the populace and their leaders effectively drove them out. In the larger Harar region, Wahabis in the past tried to evangelize the population, but the people in this heavily Sufi area roundly rejected Wahabism to the point that Wahabi missionaries finally gave up and left. This has not been the case in other areas, however, where cultural identity and religious leadership was not as strong and confident as in Harar. Telling people who have been practicing Islam since the time of the Prophet that their traditions and practices are ‘unislamic’ grated heavily on the Hararis, own Ethiopian national pride and ancient faith traditions that long predate those of Ibn Wahab. When driving through this region of Ethiopia, and when walking the streets of Harar and surrounding cities, Wahabi veils and beards are so rare as to be virtually non-existent. In fact, a visitor might go an entire day without seeing even one.
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MAJORITY SUFIS FIGHT BACK AGAINST WAHABIS
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¶8. (C) Ethiopian Muslims, by and large, are Sufis. As Sufis, the Muslim communities across Ethiopia have developed local customs and traditions of saints, zikrs (communal prayer chants), and pilgrimages, and Ethiopian Muslim writers have compiled a significant body of literature on Islam, Islamic law, and Muslim spirituality. With the advent of Wahabism in Ethiopia, these practices have come under widespread assault and the indigenous Muslim community has grown increasingly resentful and outspoken in the face of these attacks by foreigners. Muslim leaders as well have grown increasingly bold in their outspokenness against Wahabism and the IASC talks openly now of the need to counter their influence.
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WAHABISM AS ‘CULTURAL IMPERIALISM’
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¶9. (C) Given the nature of Wahabi attacks on the Ethiopian Muslim community, the picture is becoming increasingly clear through discussions with Muslim intellectuals and religious leaders that this is, in fact, ‘cultural imperialism’ by Arab/Wahabi missionaries against Ethiopian/African Muslims. Wahabi missionaries to not seek to convert Christians or non-Muslims, but instead focus all their efforts on other Muslims only. In seeking to ‘purify Islam’ among the larger Muslim community, Wahabis are in fact trying to develop a globalized version of the Faith that does not reflect the rich diversity of Muslim communities and their faith traditions around the world.
¶10. (C) Ethiopians are acutely aware that they are the oldest independent country in Africa, that they have Africa’s only indigenous alphabet, that they were never colonized, that the Falasha Jewish community in Ethiopia pre-dated the Babylonian exile, that the Ethiopian Orthodox Church is the only
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indigenous Church in Africa, and that Islam has been present in Ethiopia since the Prophet Muhammad himself, among many other points of pride. They are very proud that so many Muslims consider Harar a holy city and that so much Islamic heritage has been preserved there. This national pride is strong across all faith groups and Ethiopians greatly resent foreigners telling them that their faith is wrong, their cultural traditions are somehow wrong and need to be changed, that their centuries-old practices must be curtailed, etc.
¶11. (C) The fact that foreign Wahabi missionaries do not seek to convert non-Muslims, but instead focus exclusively on the indigenous Muslim community, shows that they are in fact trying to change the Muslim culture of Ethiopia by questioning their values (e.g., tolerance of Christians and other non-Muslims, as well as other Muslim groups), their customs (e.g., pilgrimages to saints, shrines), their traditions (e.g., Moulids), their style of dress (e.g., black Wahabi veils that cover the face instead of the open, brightly-colored veils typically worn by Muslim women in Ethiopia), and even the writings of Ethiopian Muslim thinkers whose views do not conform with Wahabi interpretations.
¶12. (C) By recognizing this movement as an aspect of cultural imperialism, it becomes clearer how to develop an effective strategy to counter this influence. Part III of this cable series will outline a range of cultural programs that post is now implementing in Ethiopia that are very well-received by the Muslim community and that show promise to further erode the impact of Wahabi missionaries in Ethiopia.
YAMAMOTO
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Reference ID – 09ADDISABABA1675
Created – 2009-07-15 13:43
Released – 2011-08-30 01:44
Classification – CONFIDENTIAL
Origin – Embassy Addis Ababa
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FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5499
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEPADJ/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 001675
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2019
TAGS: KPAO KISL KIRF SCUL PROP ET
SUBJECT: COUNTERING WAHABI INFLUENCE IN ETHIOPIA THROUGH CULTURAL PROGRAMMING
REF: 08 ADDIS ABABA 3230
Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
THIRD OF THREE CABLES ON COUNTERING WAHABI INFLUENCE IN ETHIOPIA
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SUMMARY
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¶1. (C) Every culture that has adopted Islam has its own unique traditions and practices for expressing their Faith. This is manifested through shrines, literature, faith rituals, and objects that include manuscripts, art, and even clothing and other accoutrements. In countries with mixed faith traditions, tolerance and mutual respect are usually enshrined in theological teachings, but foreign missionaries and other external influences can undermine that balance and force change on the teachings. This ‘cultural imperialism’ can be countered through cultural programming that focuses on places, objects, and traditions as they relate to indigenous Muslim communities. Similarly, it is important to help local Muslim leaders resist these external forces intellectually by providing materials written by Muslim authors that support a more orthodox interpretation of Islam in local languages. Doing so supports U.S. foreign policy objectives and may contribute to countering Islamic extremists. END SUMMARY.
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THREE-PRONGED STRATEGY: PLACES, OBJECTS, AND TRADITIONS
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¶2. (C) By recognizing Wahabism as ‘cultural imperialism,’ a strategy for countering this influence presents itself. This strategy is three-pronged, centered on places, objects, and traditions. In any situation where an indigenous culture is being threatened by external cultural influences, cultural pride (or lack thereof) can be the determining factor as to whether the indigenous culture loses the battle. In the case of Ethiopian Islam, there is great cultural pride in Ethiopia’s Islamic history and Muslim faith and practices, so it is vital to reinforce that pride and assist the local culture in asserting itself in the face of these foreign influences.
¶3. (C) Here in Ethiopia, this strategy of countering Wahabi influence through cultural programming has been done through the following grants and programs from FY-06 to the present:
PLACES:
a) The Ambassador’s Fund for Cultural Preservation (AFCP) grant to restore the Sheikh Hussein Shrine in Bale;
b) AFCP grant to restore the Teferi Mekonnen Palace in Harar (although the childhood home of Emperor Haile Selassie, the Palace now houses the City Museum, which is heavily focused on Muslim life in Harar);
c) AFCP grant to restore the Muhammad Ali House in Addis Ababa, the home of a prominent Muslim merchant that reflects the heavy influence of Muslim merchants and trade with the Middle and Far East in the 19th century.
OBJECTS:
d) Public Affairs Section (PAS) grant to establish an ‘Islamic Manuscript Preservation Center’ at the Teferi Mekonnen Palace in Harar;
e) PAS grant to the Institute of Ethiopian studies (IES) to purchase several Ethiopian Orthodox icons and Islamic manuscripts that were in danger of leaving the country;
f) PAS grant to the American Friends of the IES to pay for materials that will be used for the storage and preservation of Islamic manuscripts in Addis Ababa and for teaching Ethiopian experts how to process them;
g) PAS grant to a U.S. Fulbright Scholar to do an assessment of over 1,000 Islamic manuscripts in Harar and develop a work plan for establishing the Center there (see ‘a’ above).
TRADITIONS:
h) PAS grant to send a group of three Harari experts to the Foxfire Fund in Mountain View, Georgia, to learn about
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developing an oral history program for high school students;
i) Finally, providing two books written by a Muslim-American scholar (‘The Place of Tolerance in Islam’ and ‘The Great Theft,’ both by Khaled Abou el-Fadl) in the local languages of Amharic, Oromifa, and Somali.
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RESTORING ) AND RESPECTING ) THE PLACES
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¶4. (U) The restoration of the Sheikh Hussein Shrine through the AFCP directly impacts the tens of thousands of pilgrims who visit the shrine every year. Shrine caretakers readily publicize the role of the U.S. in rescuing the shrine and for facilitating the visits of pilgrims who venerate the tomb of Sheikh Hussein every day. Post is currently planning a small booklet that will be produced, printed, and distributed at the shrine that will give the shrine’s history, along with publicizing the role of the U.S. in preserving it. Besides American concern for the historical and cultural value of the shrine, pilgrims also perceive that the United States respects Sheikh Hussein, something the Wahabis absolutely do not.
¶5. (U) The FY-09 AFCP grant to preserve the Teferi Mekonnen Palace was also very well received by the people of Harar. In an announcement ceremony on June 25 in Harar, the PAO highlighted President Obama’s Cairo speech and noted that this grant and a second grant for preserving Islamic manuscripts is putting the President’s words into action right in their city. By showing that the U.S. cares about Harar’s Muslim heritage and is taking concrete action to preserve and protect it, these cultural programs are clearly resonating with the people of Harar and with the larger Ethiopian Muslim community, which sees Harar as its spiritual center.
¶6. (U) The Islamic Affairs Supreme Council (IASC) invited the PAO to visit the Jama Negus Mosque in Dessie in the hope that the Embassy might do a large grant to preserve that complex. That visit was detailed in Part I of this cable series. The IASC strongly hopes (as expressed by both the current leadership and the last leadership) that the Embassy will submit an AFCP proposal in FY-10 for this project and explained why doing so will help them to counter Wahabi influence.
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JAMA NEGUS AS A COUNTERPOINT TO WAHABI INFLUENCE
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¶7. (C) This particular site is illustrative of how cultural programming can counter Wahabi influence. As the first place in Ethiopia where the Birthday of the Prophet was celebrated, the site today is a center of moderate, Sufi, Ethiopian Muslim life. As local Muslim clerics and intellectuals there and in other places in Ethiopia have repeatedly told the PAO and other interlocutors, ‘Wahabis hate Moulids; they think they are unislamic.’ Moulids are, however, critical to the spiritual life of Sufi communities around the world and are a vital aspect of indigenous Muslim cultural expression in all those places where Sufis are numerous. Likewise, tombs of ‘Muslim saints’ and pilgrimages to such shrines are also vital to both Sufi and Shi’a communities and Wahabis have often attacked and destroyed these shrines as being ‘unislamic.’ In the same vein, the practice of ‘zikrs,’ the rhythmic prayers chanted by groups of devotees in communal worship, are also condemned as ‘unislamic,’ even though these are also sincere expressions of the local culture’s practice of Islam. As reported in reftel, Wahabis destroyed more than thirty such shrines in the Bale region before finally stopping their campaign in the face of virulent public opposition. Foreign Wahabi missionaries in the Wello zone thus doubly criticize the Jama Negus Mosque in Dessie as both a pilgrimage destination and the center of Moulid celebrations in Ethiopia.
¶8. (C) Arab (e.g., Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Qatari) NGOs active in Ethiopia have refused to provide any assistance to supporters of the Jama Negus Mosque, in spite of requests from Muslim leaders in the region and the activity of those NGOs in supporting new mosque construction throughout the area.
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These NGOs are almost exclusively Wahabi in orientation. This repeats a pattern already demonstrated in the Bale and Harar regions where it was only U.S. support (through the AFCP and PAS grants) that helped Ethiopian Muslims to preserve their historic shrines and manuscripts.
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PRESERVING THE OBJECTS ) ISLAMIC MANUSCRIPTS
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¶9. (U) Manuscripts are an especially important part of this strategy. Ethiopian Muslims in general, and Hararis in particular, are especially proud of the long history of Islamic learning and thought that existed in Harar over many centuries. Unique styles of calligraphy, manuscript illuminations, styles of bookbinding, and even unique contributions to Islamic thought are all characteristic of Islamic culture in Harar and the surrounding region.
¶10. (U) However, unlike Christian manuscripts, Muslim manuscripts are in great danger and their loss to Ethiopia removes them completely from their historical context. There are several reasons for this. First, Islamic manuscripts are almost exclusively written on paper as Harar was a great trade center in centuries past and paper could be easily purchased from India and the Orient. Christian manuscripts, on the other hand, are almost always written on skins, which are much more durable than paper and do not break down nearly as fast as paper does. Christian manuscripts are also written in Ge’ez or Amharic, so no matter where they end up in the world, it is obvious they were produced in Ethiopia. Muslim manuscripts, though, are almost exclusively written in Arabic, so once removed from Ethiopia, their provenance is almost always unknown and it is no longer clear that they were produced in Ethiopia ) especially when the author’s name is recorded and it is an Arabic name, as most Muslim names in Ethiopia are.
¶11. (U) Where this becomes a real cultural issue is when Ethiopian Muslim writers with Arabic names write books on Islamic law, Muslim traditions, Sufi holy men and women, etc., and the books are removed form the country and collected/studied abroad. When this happens, it may not be at all clear that the author was an Ethiopian or that the book was produced as part of a Harari school of Islamic thought. As a result, Ethiopia’s historical status in the larger Muslim world is reduced and knowledge of ‘African Islam’ is reduced.
¶12. (U) Post’s strategy in this phase is first to assess the manuscript holdings at the Teferi Mekonnen Palace by sending Fulbright Scholar Sean Winslow to Harar for three weeks to assess those holdings, as well as to visit a few of the 200-plus shrines in Harar to get an idea of the holdings that may be extant under the control of the IASC in Harar. A ‘Manuscript Preservation Center’ will then be established in the second floor of the Teferi Mekonnen Palace (after the AFCP project is completed), with a PAS grant providing for supplies and equipment needed to restore and preserve the manuscripts currently held there.
¶13. (U) Several Ethiopian manuscript experts are also being trained in preservation techniques at the Institute for Ethiopian Studies, with PAS providing a small grant to purchase supplies and equipment for the training session. This will not only help to preserve the Islamic manuscripts in Addis Ababa, but it will also help to provide the critically-needed expertise in Ethiopia for preserving these manuscripts.
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RECORDING THE TRADITIONS ) ORAL HISTORY IN HARAR
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¶14. (U) Pride in one’s heritage is critical to resisting cultural imperialist influences. In Southern Appalachia, the Foxfire Fund teaches high school students how to gather and report oral history and that history is integrated into the high school curriculum so that children gain a greater appreciation for their heritage. Through a PAS grant, three Harari history specialists spent a week at the Foxfire Fund in Mountain View, Georgia, learning about these techniques and developing ideas for how they can promote the collecting,
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recording, and study of oral history traditions in Harar, including dance, music, and other artistic traditions.
¶15. (U) Post expects that this group will be submitting proposals for small grant support in the months ahead and will give them due consideration as part of its ongoing Faith Communities Outreach strategy.
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CHALLENGING WAHABISM INTELLECTUALLY
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¶16. (C) As part of a broad Faith Communities Outreach strategy, cultural programming can contribute significantly to the achievement of foreign policy objectives. In the case of Ethiopia, these include stability, co-existence of Muslim and Christian communities, rejection of Islamic extremists by the population, and a firm stance from Ethiopian Muslim leaders that rejects Salafist teachings and practices. While no one will argue that all Wahabis are Salafists, there is clearly a link between the growth in Salafism and the spread of Wahabism by foreign missionaries and Arab NGOs. Ethiopian Muslim traditions, as in most African countries where Islam has been a factor, are mainly derived from Sufi faith traditions. With an emphasis on tolerance and mutual respect for ‘the People of the Book’ (Jews, Christians, and Muslims), a stress on internal (not external ) Jihad, and customs and practices that often seem to mimic Christian practices, many Sufi traditions come under direct assault from Wahabi activists who see them as an impediment to the imposition of Wahabism in areas of strategic interest to them.
¶17. (C) Cultural programs that strengthen the indigenous Muslim community against foreign encroachment ultimately help to preserve the delicate balance between faith communities that has developed over the centuries, especially in Africa. Doing so also demonstrates to the rest of the world that a great religion such as Islam can come in many ‘flavors’ and that every culture can adapt itself to Islam while adapting Islam to itself without corrupting the essential core beliefs of the Faith. There is not one version of Islam that applies to all, but rather it is a faith rich in diversity and all forms of it should be respected ) not just one.
¶18. (C) Any culture is usually proud of its contributions to the world’s religious heritage and efforts to protect and preserve those contributions are widely appreciated within that culture. Such cultural programming does not have to be very expensive, especially when considered within the larger context of U.S. assistance, but it can have significant Public Diplomacy payoff for the United States and contribute measurably to foreign policy success. When well-considered and executed creatively, cultural programming can make a real difference in turning back Islamic extremism and turning public opinion against activists who seek to overturn the existing order and import a brand of Islam that breeds conflict through its corrosive teachings that run counter to more orthodox interpretations of the Koran.
YAMAMOTO
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Check the Wikileaks Archive for previous and forthcoming posts.
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