There have been curious developments inside Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam camp in the past four weeks. It appears now, this may turn out to be another turning point the
In mid-December, Hizbul Islam, led by Hassan Dahir Aweys, joined Al-Shabaab, though there had been frequent clashes among the two groups in earlier weeks to control check points. The recent one is Al-Shabaab’s attack to take two ‘particularly lucarative’ check points in Burhakaba town controlled by Hizbul Islam. Yet, reportedly, it took only a short two-day’s negotiation for Dahir Aweys ‘to accept the inevitable and join Al-Shabaab’. An episode which A Week in The Horn described saying: ‘it is rather that Al-Shabaab has taken over Hizbul Islam as that organization began to fall apart into its component factions in the face of recent military defeats.’ One of the likely contributing factor is the confiscation of a consignment of weapons intended for Hizbul Islam by the Transitional Federal Government that worsened its logistical problems.
The ‘merger’ of the two terrorist groups was followed by a restructuring of Al-Shabaab’s leadership, including the replacement of the Emir of Al-Shabaab (overall commander) Ahmed Abdi Godane by Ibrahim Al-Afghani. Other changes include: ‘Ahmed Godane “Abu Zubeyr” is in charge of Al-Shabaab operations in Somaliland; Fuad Shongole is to concentrate on Puntland; Sheikh Muktar Robow will continue to have responsibility for Bay and Bakool, and Hassan Turki to have charge of Lower Juba including Kismayo. Mogadishu and the surrounding areas are to be under Sheikh Ali Dhere and Abdallah Fazul. Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys is to be engaged in the central regions.’
Subsequently, however, the former Emir, Ahmed Abdi Godane, took revenge by eliminating ten middle-ranking Hizbul Islam commanders for their alleged involvement in ambushing and killing four Al-Shabaab officers three months earlier. An action opposed by other leaders who are closed to the current Emir- of Al-Shabaab. In fact, in the same week, two senior commanders allied to the former Emir Ahmed Abdi Godane have been arrested in Kismayo by Sheikh Hassan Yaqub.
Now, the future role of Dahir Aweys and his forces has become a source of further dispute inside Al-Shabaab. That is: ‘whether Hassan Dahir Aweys and elements of Hizbul Islam should continue as an armed faction within Al-Shabaab or whether he and the group should be completely disarmed and retrained.’ In fact, this issue is presumed to have been the cause of the change in Al-Shabaab leadership. A related issue is that whether Dahir Aweys can mobilize an effective clan militia in Central Somalia and his ability to lead a successful campaign against Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a, which is controls his home area of Dusa Mareban and an ally of the UN-recognized Transitional Federal Government.
Al-Shabaab’s leadership is now divided on this issue. Some leaders of Al-Shabaab are in favor of a continued active role for Hassan Dahir Aweys, among them Sheikh Muktar Robow and Fuad Shongole, currently in charge of Al-Shabaab activities in Bay and Bakool, and Puntland respectively. The other group does not believe Dahir Aweys can play significant political or religious role any amore. This includes the former Emir of Al-Shabaab Abdi Godane. Perhaps, this view is shared(the press release is not clear on this point) by Sheikh Mohamed Abu Faid, a Saudi Arabian, as financial manager; Abu Musa Mombasa (Pakistani) head of security and training; and Mahmoud Mujajir, from Sudan, responsible for the recruitment of suicide bombers.
According to the latest press release, the disagreement may be part of a larger dispute within Al-Shabaab. The press release states:
It certainly marks a division between the different ideological views over just how far Al-Shabaab should operate with a nationalistic or an international agenda, on how closely it should ally with al-Qaeda. This also relates to the inter-clan relationships of Al-Shabaab leaders, and to such factors as terrorist attacks outside Somalia or international relief efforts inside Somalia. Some of Al-Shabaab’s leadership continue to strongly support the banning of relief efforts by humanitarian agencies in areas they claim to control; others insist that the seriousness of the drought in southern areas means that such agencies should be allowed to return.
Read below excerpts from the press releases of the past four weeks. Links to each are provided at the top of the excerpts.
Updates, and background exposition, on Al-Shabaab and Somalia’s political and security matters will be provided in the coming weeks in this blog.
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A Week in The Horn – December 24/2010
Despite the clashes between Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, there are now reports of an alliance between Hizbul Islam and one of the factions of Al-Shabaab. Last week, a consignment of weapons intended for Hizbul Islam was seized by TFG troops on the edge of Mogadishu. This was apparently a last ditch effort to reinforce Hizbul Islam’s forces and open another effort to try to retake Burhakaba. On December 15th a meeting attended by Hizbul Islam’s leader, Sheikh Hassan Dahir ‘Aweys’, announced Hizbul Islam’s intention to retake the towns lost to Al-Shabaab. However, without this weaponry it seems Hizbul Islam had no other option left. After a short two day’s negotiation, Hassan Dahir ‘Aweys’ appears to have accepted the inevitable and joined Al-Shabaab.
It remains to be seen how far the supporters of Sheikh ‘Aweys’ will accept this decision. Hizbul Islam is made up of four small factions and one of them, the Ras Kamboni militia, split earlier after its leader , Sheikh Hassan ‘Turki’ announced he was joining Al-Shabaab and most of its members left the organization. Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam have few ideological differences and disagree largely over the distribution of resources. It was this which led to the fighting in Kismayo and the defeat of Hizbul Islam there. The Burhakaba incident is another indicator of conflict between the two groups over resources. As we have indicated time and again the two groups share a similar determination to impose the same extremist versions of Sharia’a on the people of Somalia. Neither is prepared to become a partner for peace and national reconciliation in Somalia.
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A Week in The Horn – December 31/2010
In the meantime, following the recent decision by Hizbul Islam to join Al-Shabaab, and the takeover of the last Hizbul Islam positions by Al-Shabaab fighters, the integration of the two groups has given rise to a number of developments on the ground, including changes in the leadership of Al-Shabaab. The new overall commander of the group is to be Ibrahim Al-Afghani, replacing Emir Ahmed Abdi Godane, while a decentralized system has been set up to accommodate other leading figures. Ahmed Godane “Abu Zubeyr” is in charge of Al-Shabaab operations in Somaliland; Fuad Shongole is to concentrate on Puntland; Sheikh Muktar Robow will continue to have responsibility for Bay and Bakool, and Hassan Turki to have charge of Lower Juba including Kismayo. Mogadishu and the surrounding areas are to be under Sheikh Ali Dhere and Abdallah Fazul. Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys is to be engaged in the central regions though for the time being he has gone to Kismayo for “rehabilitation”. He is, of course, now working once again with former colleagues from both Al-Itihaad and the Islamic Courts Union when he was active in both groups in trying to manage differences between so-called moderates and extremists. Reports suggest that senior Hizbul Islam officials will be undergoing a period of briefing from Al-Shabaab, and Hizbul Islam fighters of training in Al-Shabaab’s methods of conflict.
This merger underlines what A Week in the Horn has consistently argued – that Hizbul Islam was no different from Al-Shabaab and it has never been ready to join the peace process. Whatever some in the international community might have claimed, there has never been any real possibility of negotiations with Hassan Dahir Aweys or of molding Hizbul Islam to a peaceful approach. The final proof lies in this “official” amalgamation of Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab, though it is rather that Al-Shahaab has taken over Hizbul Islam as that organization began to fall apart into its component factions in the face of recent military defeats.
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A Week in The Horn – January 07/2010
At the same time it is already clear that the unification of Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam is causing some problems. It appears some Al-Shabaab leaders have taken revenge for previous activities by Hizbul Islam officials. The former Emir, Ahmed Abdi Godane ‘Abu-Zubeyr’ is reported to have eliminated ten middle-ranking Hizbul Islam commanders who were alleged to have been involved in ambushing and killing four Al-Shabaab officers three months earlier. Sources on the ground claim this action has not been received positively by other Al-Shabaab leaders including Sheikh Mukhtar Robow and the Al-Shabaab spokesperson, Sheikh Ali Dhere. In Kismayo, there have been reports that Sheikh Hassan Yaqub, a close relative of Sheikh Mukhtar Robow, has arrested two senior Al-Shabaab commanders who were close to Ahmed Abdi Godane.
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A Week in The Horn – January 14/2010
Sheikh Hassan Dahir ‘Aweys’, head of the now defunct Hizbul Islam, handed himself and his militia over to Al-Shabaab last month, but, ironically, the collapse of Hizbul Islam has become a cause of further disputes within Al-Shabaab’s leadership. Indeed, it appears the main reason for the replacement of Abdi Godane as Emir of Al-Shabaab by Ibrahim al-Afghani last month was disagreement over the future role of Colonel Hassan. The disagreement arose when the leadership considered whether Hassan Dahir Aweys and elements of Hizbul Islam should continue as an armed faction within Al-Shabaab or whether he and the group should be completely disarmed and retrained. It might be recalled that when Hassan Turki officially joined Al-Shabaab in Lower Juba in 2009 most of his militia refused to follow him, and Al-Shabaab insisted that any who did must be retrained. As a result he no longer has any independent militia forces of his own.
As previously indicated in A Week in the Horn, the disputes within Al-Shabaab’s leadership have largely been between those who want all elements of the forces of Hassan Dahir ‘Aweys’ to be completely disbanded and those who still consider him to be a leader with significant clan support and who should therefore be allowed to maintain his own militia. The latter group supporting a continued active role for Hassan Dahir ‘Aweys’ include Sheikh Muktar Robow and Fuad Shongole, currently in charge of Al-Shabaab activities in Bay and Bakool, and Puntland respectively. They argue that allowing Hassan Dahir ‘Aweys’ to keep control of some forces will help him mobilize a clan militia which could be helpful to Al-Shabaab in Galgudud region in central Somalia. Reports from ‘Eel Buur in Galgudud that Al-Shabaab is deploying large numbers of fighters in the area underlines the possibility that Al-Shabaab is preparing to support an attempt by Hassan Dahir ‘Aweys’ to try and attack his home area of Dusa Mareb, now controlled by Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a, the ally of the TFG. Elders in ‘Eel Buur have criticized Al-Shabaab’s arrest of a leading businessman and of some elders in the town in the last week.
The other group within Al-Shabaab’s leadership includes Abdi Godane, replaced as Al-Shabaab’s Emir at the shura meeting on December 25th by Ibrahim al-Afghani who has been an ally of Sheikh Muktar Robow. Abdi Godane sees Hassan Dahir ‘Aweys’ as a ‘lame duck’, with no longer any future as a significant political or religious player. However, the dispute has much wider ramifications. Abdi Godane has been the main proponent of incorporating foreign elements into Al-Shabaab. Among those who have been holding senior positions in Al-Shabaab have been Sheikh Mohamed Abu Faid, a Saudi Arabian, as financial manager; Abu Musa Mombasa (Pakistani) head of security and training; and Mahmoud Mujajir, from Sudan, responsible for the recruitment of suicide bombers.
Sources following developments on the ground closely consider the disagreement as part of a larger dispute within Al-Shabaab. It certainly marks a division between the different ideological views over just how far Al-Shabaab should operate with a nationalistic or an international agenda, on how closely it should ally with al-Qaeda. This also relates to the inter-clan relationships of Al-Shabaab leaders, and to such factors as terrorist attacks outside Somalia or international relief efforts inside Somalia. Some of Al-Shabaab’s leadership continue to strongly support the banning of relief efforts by humanitarian agencies in areas they claim to control; others insist that the seriousness of the drought in southern areas means that such agencies should be allowed to return.
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