1. Background
Garissa University College attack in Kenya left close to 150 young students massacred by al Shabaab. Hundreds of people have been holding a candle-lit vigil in Kenya’s capital, Nairobi, to remember the victims of last week’s attack at Garissa University College by al-Shabab gunmen. A temporary shrine of crosses and candles has been set up and photos of the 148 victims of the group’s deadliest attack in Kenya are on show. Earlier, about 2,500 people marched in Garissa against the Somali militants. Kenya has frozen the accounts of 86 people thought to be funding al-Shabaab. Thirteen hawalas – informal money transfer services – have also been closed down. Hawalas are widely used by Somalis who depend on relatives abroad as a cheap and quick means to receive money. Interior Minister Joseph Nkaiserry said the names of the individuals and hawalas had not yet been released. Separately Five Kenyans appeared in court in Nairobi on Tuesday for suspected links with the attackers (BBC, 2015:1).
Conflicts have always been part of human society, but today radicalism is one form of a conflict that is haunting nations globally. In addition, it has long been recognized as a serious foreign and domestic security threat to many countries throughout the world (Harmony Project, 2006). Such use of unmitigated violence against civilians has indeed been a source of much concern for centuries now. However, the events of September 11, 2001 have single-handedly changed the way the problem is looked at by literally all inhabitants of the world. Today more than ever, the world talks and writes about radicalism much regularly. International radical networks have caused untold destruction and loss of life around the world, and yet the response by and the reaction to these acts is largely uncoordinated (Harmony Project, 2006). While there is an almost universal agreement as to the dangers posed by radicalism, there is nonetheless lack of clarity as to its causes, nature as well as the most effective mechanisms to prevent, detect and face its challenges. This has to do with myriad of factors ranging from ideological to operational renditions. Nevertheless, it is widely acknowledged that anti-radicalism efforts can better achieve their desired results if the impediments to concerted actions are properly addressed through cooperation among various stakeholders at all levels.
Different sources have given different definitions to the concept of radicalism depending on the angle from which they look at the problem. While some of this definition is based on ideological grounds, still other definitions take into account the operational aspect of it focusing rather on what consequences it has. As the common saying goes, one’s radical could very well be another’s freedom fighter. Otherwise, the word radicalism does not seem to have any precise definition. For example, Webster’s dictionary defines radicalism in terms of the following three elements: The state of fear and submission produced; radical method of governing or of resisting a Government; and the systematic use of horror especially as a means of gaining some political end (Webster, 2003).
2. Radicalism in the Horn of Africa
2.1. Radicalism and horror
There is as much confusion about the root causes of radicalism as there is about how to define the concept. But there is a more or less universal agreement that the major causes are ideological, socio-economic as well as religious (compare ICPAT, 2008, p.10) Ideological causes explain the carnage and destruction political groups perpetrate on civilians in the name of some ill-defined political objective such as secession of a certain group or groups of people. The engagement of certain groups in similarly destructive activities in the name of addressing some kind of social or economic injustice is yet another cause of radicalism. However, more importantly, the great deal of violence that is being visited upon civilians in almost all corners of the world in the name of promoting some religious idea or another is the most potent cause of radicalism today.
Depending on what one perceives to be the root cause of radicalism, the responses by governments has also been varying to a degree or another. The US and its allies have used tools at their disposal, including diplomacy, international cooperation, and constructive engagement to economic sanctions, covert action, physical security enhancement, and military force (Harmony Project, 2006). The efficacy of anti-radicalism campaigns depends on the extent to which the appropriate combination of approaches is followed. More often than not, the approaches employed by many governments leave a lot to be desired because they put undue emphasis on one or another aspect of these approaches.
A modern trend in radicalism is toward well-organized, self-financed, international networks of radicals. Another trend of radicalism is the emergence of religiously or ideologically motivated. Radical groups using religion as a pretext, pose radical threats of varying kinds to interests of various states. A third trend is the apparent growth of cross-national links of radical organizations, which may involve combinations of military training, funding, technology transfer, or political advice. As a global phenomenon, a major challenge facing policy makers is how to maximize international cooperation, without unduly compromising important national security interests (Perl, 2004).
2.2. The Greater Horn of Africa sub-region
The Greater Horn of Africa sub-region is one of the most conflict ragged neighborhoods in the world. According to some writers, the Horn of Africa has been the target of radicals because of the geopolitical significance of the Sub-region (Weldeselassie, 2004). Others claim that the main causes are weak security infrastructure, porous and un-policed borders, and collapse of the state of Somalia. Though not by any means confined to it, the conflict in Somalia, which has been going on for more than two decades now, has further contributed to the growing crisis in the sub-region. It is almost commonplace to think of Somalia as synonymous with lawlessness and violence. If there is anything new about the kind of conflict that is raging in Somalia today, it must be the fact that the clan dynamics that has characterized the conflict in that country has now taken on a new dimension with the advent of radical violence on a scale unheard of before.
Radicalism as a deliberate use of violence to achieve political ends is not new to Somalia (Fisseha, 2008). In fact, radicalism in Somalia dates as far back as early 1980s when the first open resort to political violence was made by hard line Islamist clerics and their allies from Siad Barre’s defunct army brought together like-minded people under the umbrella of Al-Itihad Al-Islamia, or better known by its acronym, AIAI. Although launched with the declared objective of establishing a caliphate in the Horn of Africa, its leaders also sought to rally the Somali people behind their cause by re-introducing the failed irredentist ambitions of Siad Barre aimed at incorporating all Somali speaking peoples in neighboring countries. AIAI was from the very outset making open threats to unleash violence in Ethiopia as part of its objective to forcibly occupy the Somali sub-region of Ethiopia (Fisseha, 2008).
The rhetoric against Ethiopia was elevated to its next level when in the mid-1990s Al- Itihad infiltrated its agents through Ethiopia’s vast borders and managed to carry out bomb attacks on civilian targets inside many parts of Ethiopia including Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa and Jijiga, among other places. The explosions had caused considerable loss of life and destruction of property over the years. It had in its ranks hundreds of radicals from as far away place as Pakistan and Morocco and battle-hardened Mujahedeen from Europe and the Middle East (Fisseha, 2008). While the swift action by the Ethiopian Defense forces and the relentless efforts of the security forces did succeed in dismantling a significant edifice of AIAI’s radical network, its leaders nevertheless did never refrain from hatching radical plot after another (Bruton, 2010).
With their core leadership and international personnel largely destroyed or captured, the leaders of AIAI were mainly pre-occupied with trying to multiply its followers through numerous tactics. Former leaders of AIAI such as Hassan Dahir Aweys, a former colonel in Siad Barre’s army, recast themselves as clerics of Wahabi Islam to mount their irredentist ambitions in earnest. Interestingly, opportunity presented itself in the mid-2000s when local clan leaders took it upon themselves to sort things out in their respective localities by forming Islamic courts to manage local affairs (Osman, ND). While the Islamic Courts were largely formed for benign motives with most of them firmly opposed to the debilitating consequences of rampant War-Lordism, the inclusion of some leaders of Al-Itihad in the effort to bring together the various Islamic Courts throughout Somalia as part of re-instating some kind of unified authority in the country. The culmination of these efforts was the establishment in late 2005 of the Union of Islamic Courts (ICU). Whatever benign motives may have originally been part of the move to bring the Islamic Courts together, they were, however, soon to be rendered obsolete, when the hardliners of the former Al-Itihad took the reins of power effectively hijacking the ICU’s central leadership (Fisseha, 2008).
The extremist wing of ICU—the Al-Shabaab—launched ruthless campaign of violence and intimidation against civilians ushering in an era of Al Qaeda style radical activities that have now become the preferred weapon of choice of Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab was from the very outset very untypical of Somali militant forces in that it not only adhered to an extremist interpretation of Islam unusual among the Somalis, but also in its open espousal of violence and horror as weapons to achieve its political ends than is hitherto pursued by other Somali insurgencies. It was mostly led by individuals who had taken part in Jihads elsewhere in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Chechnya (Fisseha, 2008). Its ranks were also swollen by several hundreds of foreign jihadists from all over the world that had from the beginning given its movement an international—rather than local—nature. More importantly, Al-Shabaab’s radical campaigns were further emboldened by a number of factors that are with few exception are mainly extrinsic to Somali society.
2.3. Radicalism in the sub-region is rampant:
There are also radical groups in other countries in the sub-region, largely based on religious grounds. Moreover, the fact that the sub-region straddles Africa and the Middle East has had its own contributions in this regard. It is believed that the causes for radical acts in the sub-region are diverse owing to the various compositions of the people in the sub-region and different social, economic and cultural backgrounds.
Radicalism in the sub-region has been described variously as both a tactic and strategy; a crime and a holy duty; a justified reaction to oppression and an inexcusable abomination. Much depends on whose point of view is being represented. radicalism has often been an effective tactic for the weaker side in a conflict. As an asymmetric form of conflict, it confers coercive power with many of the advantages of military force at a fraction of the cost. Due to the secretive nature and small size of radical organizations, they often offer opponents no clear organization to defend against or to deter. Radicalism is a means to an “end” or objective. Methods may vary from incident to incident but in review of radicalism during the last two centuries, methods appear strikingly similar in concept. What may be of most concern is the lethality and damage that adaptive radicals can inflict when armed with expanding technologies and intellect.
The United Nations produced this definition in 1992; “An anxiety inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets.” A commonly accepted academic definition starts with the UN definition quoted above and adds two sentences containing such concepts as “message generators” and ‘violence based communication processes.” There is clearly a wide choice of definitions for radicalism. Despite this, there are elements in common among the majority of useful definitions. Common threads of the various definitions identify radicalism as: political, psychological, violent, dynamic, and deliberate
A radical act is a political act or is committed with the intention to cause a political effect. The supreme objectives of radicalism are political, motivated by a deeply held grievance over some form of injustice that may be social or economic, but it is nonetheless blamed on a political authority. The intended results of radical acts cause a psychological effect or horror. They are aimed at a target audience other than the actual victims of the act. The intended target audience of the radical act is the soft target, the civilian population or the elite in the political, social or military establishment.
Violence, coercion, and destruction are used in the commission of the act to produce the desired effect. Even if casualties and material destruction are not the result of a radical operation, the threat or potential of violence is what produces the intended effect. Radical groups demand change, revolution or political movement. The radical worldview that justifies radicalism mandates drastic action to destroy or alter the status quo. Even if the goals of a movement are reactionary in nature, they may require action to “turn back the clock” or restore some cherished value system that is extinct. Nobody commits violent attacks on innocents to keep things “just the way they are.”
Radicalism is an activity planned and intended to achieve particular goals. It is a rationally employed with a selected tactic. Since the victims of radical violence are often of little import, with one being as good for the radicals’ purposes as another, victim or target selection can appear random or unprovoked. However, the target will contain symbolic value or be capable of eliciting emotional response according to the radicals’ goals. The actual target of radicalism is not necessarily the victim of the violence, but the psychological impact on the society or population. This psychological impact is intended to create an environment of fear and intimidation that radicals can then manipulate to force others to submit or agree to their demands.
2.4. Differences between radicalism and insurgency
Various attempts have been made to distinguish among types of radical activities. It is vital to bear in mind however, that there are many kinds of radical movements, and no single theory cover all of them. There are various classes of radicalism. Those are revolutionary, sub revolutionary, and establishment radicalism. revolutionary radicalism seeks the complete abolition of a political system and its replacement with new structures. Sub revolutionary radicalism is used not to overthrow the existing regime but to modify the existing political structures. Establishment radicalism often called state sponsored radicalism is employed by governments against other governments, citizens against factions within the government or against foreign government or groups. It refers to acts of horror, such as torture, killings mass arrest etc. which are conducted by the organ of state against its own population, whether the entire population, certain segments thereof or population of an occupied country which is aimed at securing and maintaining a desired degree of loyalty from its citizens.
State acquiescence to radicalism occurs when state approves or fails to condemn or act against an act of radicalism carried out by a third party. Recently, other new categories of radicalism such as nuclear and cyber radicalism are emerging. Cyber threat is the convergence of radicalism and cyberspace. Nuclear threat is based on the tenet why should one use an axe when you can use a bulldozer. That was Osama Bin Laden’s question in 1996 to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the chief planner of the most deadly attack on USA. Most observers agree that most political and ideological groups have under certain circumstances resorted to governmental and non-governmental radicalism. However, whatever the purposes or the classifications, all acts of radicalism are abhorrent; it is a disease that destroys the very structure of global society. State radicalism must be punished and individuals responsible for radical acts must be brought to justice (Tesfaye, 2010).
Radical operations are typically prepared to minimize risk and achieve the highest probability of success. They focus on avoiding the opponents’ strengths and concentrating on their weaknesses. Emphasis is on maximizing security and target effects. In practice, that means the least number of personnel, and the most effective weapons practicable. To accomplish this, extensive planning is conducted, with an emphasis on target surveillance and reconnaissance.
Collection of intelligence against potential targets may continue for years before an operation is decided upon. While some targets may be “soft” enough for shorter periods of observation, the information gathering will still be intense. In addition, operations planned or underway may be altered, delayed, or cancelled entirely due to changes to the target or local conditions. radicals plan campaigns to combine successive achievements of operational objectives into accomplishing strategic goals. There is no universal “staff school” model for radical planning, but experience and success has shown radicals what works for effective plans and operations. radical organizations exchange personnel and training with each other, and study the methods and operational successes of groups they have no direct contact with. Innovation is a proven key component of operational success. Using new weapons or technology, or old systems in innovative, unexpected ways, allows radicals to defeat or avoid defensive measures. radical operational planning can be analyzed according to requirements common to all operations. The planning and operation cycle is valid for traditional hierarchically organized groups, as well as the decentralized “network” type organizations. The differences between the two organizations are the location of decision making at the various steps of the cycle, and the method of task organizing and providing support for the operation.
2.5. Forms of radicalism
A radical group can use threats to coerce or prevent actions by a targeted individual or population. Threats and tricks can dull the effectiveness of preventive or countermeasures when a targeted individual or population loses situational awareness of an actual radical target, or disperses finite assets against many possible threats. At the less lethal end of the spectrum, hoaxes can simply be methods to annoy and wear down security forces, and keep the population constantly agitated. Fake bomb threats, leaving suspicious items in public places, and talcum powder “anthrax” attacks bleed time and effort from other security operations, and contribute to uncertainty and fear. Such activities can be used to gain information about the target’s response to a potential attack. Where the occupants go during the evacuation of a building and how long it takes them to exit are useful elements of information in operational planning, and can be obtained through simply making an anonymous phone call or activating a fire alarm.
Observation of regularly scheduled exercises or drills of emergency response procedures can provide similar information. This technique can also be combined with an actual attack to avoid fixed security measures. For example, the occupants of a bomb resistant building with controlled access and a guard force could be forced to evacuate by a plausible, but false, threat. Many security plans would respect the potential danger such a threat represented, and evacuate the building. Unless properly secured, the evacuation has made the occupants more vulnerable to such weapons as a car bomb or other mass casualty techniques placed near the exits, or at a designated assembly point.
Extortion is one example of a threat that obtains money, materiel, information, or support by force or intimidation. Extortion is often used during the formative period of a group or by groups that fail to develop more sophisticated financial skills. However, the opportunity to engage in more lucrative money making activities, such as drug trafficking, may eventually replace the need to extort by some groups. Extortion takes the form of “war taxes” or protection money. Depending on the structure of the radical organization, the logistics and support cells extort money from local businesses in exchange for protection, which means not harming or bothering the business or its members. Members of the intelligence cells may also extort to collect required information.
Another form of extortion is intimidation. Intelligence cells or a specialized team intimidates people to obtain information on the group’s enemy or to provide resources. Death threats against an individual or his family cause him to provide information or resources to a group with which he has no interest. A radical group also intimidates people not to take action. For example, enemy security personnel may not implement required security measures because of intimidation. The information cell of a radical group helps create and maintain the fear caused by extortion through its propaganda and deception actions. The power of extortion and blackmail as a means of coercing individuals should not be underestimated. Several radical groups have successfully used these techniques to force individuals to carry out suicide bombing missions. These include arson – sabotage, bombing, kidnapping, hostage taking, hijacking, seizure, assassination, weapons of mass destruction, air transport threats, maritime threats, suicide tactics and raid or ambush.
2.6. Future Trends of radicalism
The future of radicalism rests with intense motivational extremism, flexible organizational structure, improved operational capabilities, expanded transnational associations, increased weapons system lethality, intended mass casualties, mayhem and chaos and exploited mass media marketing. radicalism adopts to meet the challenges of emerging societies and governments. radicalism exploits developments in technology and individual or group belief systems. At least, two overarching trends indicate the direction of radicalism and radical groups.
Radicalism is becoming a more networking based that encourages a loosely organized, self-financed, organizational structure. The motivation of radical groups appear to be based increasingly on religious belief extreme ideological absolutes, international or transnational cooperation among radical groups provides an improved ability to recruit members, develop fiscal support and resources, gain skill making, transfer of technology and when desired political advice. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the specter of their effects clearly amplify the dangers of a radical act, information is readily available on many aspects of chemical, biological, ideological, nuclear and conventional high yield explosives. Material for attempting the construction of WMD is easily accessible in the public domain the knowledge and technological means of specialists to produce WMD is a shadowy area of science, crime and intrigue available to the radical.
3. Conclusion
3.1. The Clash of Civilizations
From Darfur to the jungles of the River Zaire, from the Eritrean plateau to South Sudan, from trouble Somalia to the genocidal communities of Rwanda and Burundi, from the violent cities and borders of Kenya to Northern Uganda; new faces and forces of vulnerability and poverty haunt the sub-region. Conflicts, corruption, disasters, poverty and pandemics now threaten the sub-region with a calamity unforeseen even during the Great African Famine of the 1980s; so much so that the G8 has made this a basket case for international action. Washington Post’s Emily Wax (2005) asserts that in Darfur, Sudan, “three years after a government-backed militia began fighting rebels and residents in this region of western Sudan, much of the conventional wisdom surrounding the conflict — including the religious, ethnic and economic factors that drive it — fails to match the realities on the ground. Tens of thousands have died and some 2.5 million have been displaced, with no end to the conflict in sight. Here are five truths to challenge the most common misconceptions about Darfur: nearly everyone is Muslim[i].
Samuel P. Huntington in his work “The Clash of Civilizations” proposed that people’s cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world. In this Huntington believed that while the age of ideology had ended, the world had only reverted to a normal state of affairs characterized by cultural conflict. In his thesis, he argued that the primary axis of conflict in the future would be along cultural and religious lines. As an extension, he posits that the concept of different civilizations, as the highest rank of cultural identity, will become increasingly useful in analyzing the potential for conflict.
His hypothesis was nestled in the fact that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. Huntington began his thinking by surveying the diverse theories about the nature of global politics in the post-Cold War period. Some theorists and writers argued that human rights, liberal democracy and capitalist free market economy had become the only remaining ideological alternative for nations in the post-Cold War world. Specifically, Francis Fukuyama argued that the world had reached the end of history in a Hegelian sense. Huntington believed that while the age of ideology had ended, the world had only reverted to a normal state of affairs characterized by cultural conflict. In his thesis, he argued that the primary axis of conflict in the future would be along cultural and religious lines. As an extension, he posits that the concept of different civilizations, as the highest rank of cultural identity, will become increasingly useful in analyzing the potential for conflict.
Indeed, global poverty, injustice and repression have created mutual suspicion, fear and misunderstanding between societies. The heightened instability of coexistence between different cultures and faiths with divergent backgrounds has led to exploitation of the sad opportunities by extremists from all sides. This has resulted in an unprecedented violence and human insecurity. The fact that there is an unwavering consensus on the necessity to reach a common ground between diverse ethnic and religious groups based on the tolerance, understanding and respect of the fundamental set of values and beliefs of each group is indeed promising.
3.2. Way forward
3.2.1. Arenas of action taken by faith leaders for forging the alliance of civilizations
Home-grown conflict management is a multidisciplinary field of action that seeks to address the question of how people can make better decisions together, particularly on difficult, contentious issues. Conflict management refers to a variety of collaborative approaches that seek to reach a mutually acceptable resolution of issues in a conflict through a voluntary process. Such approaches were developed as alternatives to adversarial or non-consensual strategies, such as judicial or legal recourse, unilaterally initiated public information campaigns, or partisan political action. Choosing the correct strategy through which to address a particular conflict is in itself a strategic choice. Parties to a dispute must first decide whether to seek resolution to a conflict through a non-consensual process or through a more collaborative means. The voluntary problem solving and decision-making methods most often employed in conflict management are conciliation, negotiation and mediation which involve the assistance of a neutral third party in a negotiation process. The processes are often combined with each other in practice. Thus, an effort originally focused on conciliation may develop into a negotiation, which may in turn be enhanced by mediation. Similarly, individuals may play more than one role in addressing a dispute, once the decision has been made to use conflict management processes, the parties must decide on which specific approach to employ.
No single approach is effective in all cases. The circumstances of conflict and therefore the obstacles to agreement vary from one case to another. Disputes may involve many of few parties, the problem may be more or less urgent, emotional investment of the stakeholders may vary, the public interest may or may not be at stake, and the factors involved may be well understood or more uncertain. Gaining expertise in conflict management includes learning about the specific advantages and disadvantages of the various strategies, and assessing which one is best in addressing a particular conflict situation. This is intended as a concise statement of what is expected of each political group or religious sects and plaintiffs in society and polity. It presents questions, guidelines and issues, which each study site must address and adhere to. In order to realize the goals and objectives of the adaptive conflict management strategy initiative, facilitators will seek to capture the synergies arising out of the interaction between contemporary and indigenous knowledge, and the conditions and processes which produce and reinforce indigenous conflict management.
Many factors have been found to be helpful in analyzing a conflict, to decide whether it could be addressed through conflict management approach. If careful analysis suggests that a dispute could be negotiated or mediated, these same factors are important in determining the structure and conduct of the dispute resolution process. An important premise that successful conflict management relies is on the participation of all legitimate parties or “stakeholders” in a dispute. Different stakeholders must accept the right of other stakeholders to take part. No conflict can be considered resolved if any group whose interests are affected has been left out of the negotiation of mediation. Accordingly, this importance to inclusiveness stems from a belief and philosophical commitment to participatory processes, as well as from several practical considerations.
Power imbalances are virtually always an issue in a negotiation and problems that result from negotiating in situations of unequal power may seriously undermine efforts at reaching a lasting accord. Parties will not negotiate in good faith or submit a dispute to mediation unless they believe it is in their best interest to do so. Stakeholders may differ in military power, wealth, numbers, education and eloquence, familiarity with the process, extent of preparation and focus, or recognized legitimacy as an entity or institution. It is often difficult for very unequal parties to engage in productive, let alone fair, negotiation, which could lead to mutual gain.
However intransigent a more powerful political group or religious sects might appear, it is useful for weaker parties to realize that opposing stakeholders are neither monolithic nor uniformly adversarial. Conflicts are dynamic, and positions and alliances change; negotiators need to detect and take advantage of the “cracks” and vulnerabilities that present themselves. Parties of unequal power enter into negotiations with different motivations and different expectations. Where the more powerful group or religious sect to a dispute is the stake or a commercial interest, conflict management might be attractive because approaches different from a negotiated settlement are often unattractive, ineffective and expensive. The weaker or religious sects might agree to participate in such a negotiation because a negotiated agreement is presumably more in its interest than the status quo. Furthermore, the legitimization of the weaker group or religious sect’s perspective and the validation of its position through the negotiation process can also result in group empowerment and transformation (ACCORD, 1996).
3.2.2. Tools for advancing the alliance of cultures and faiths
Our vision is to see a nation and the sub region is a community of the faithful governed by justice, respect for rights of citizens and plural organizations. Our mission is to build the justice pedestal on solid grounds by introducing the rules of the game and institutions necessary to institutionalize democracy in Greater Horn of Africa in form grounds. Our objective is to strengthen the strategies, process, institutions and policies for conflict management at all levels – national and local, governing coalition and opposition, civil society and the private sector
3.2.2.1. Strengthening a rights culture and democratic institutions:
Governing institutions include legislatures, legal and judicial systems and electoral bodies. Legislatures mediate differing interests and debate and establish policies, laws and resource priorities that directly affect the political environment and encourage and support sustainable human development. Independent institutions set up by the legislature ensure transparent national and local elections, ultimately securing human rights and political legitimacy. Independent judiciaries uphold the rule of law, bringing security and predictability to religious social, political and economic relations and assuring the protection of human rights. This builds the capacity in governing institutions and supports the development of transparent and accountable processes.
3.2.2.2. Alliance of cultures requires respect for human rights
This demands freedom from discrimination and violence, equal opportunity, due process, freedom of expression and organization, and transparent, accountable government. These rights include not only political and civil rights but also the right to development. The initiative helps groups to become stronger, self-sustaining and full participants in the decision-making process; bringing government and civil society together to discuss policies and programs and to help create a safe and impartial space that encourages trust and lasting relationships.
3.2.2.3.Inter-faith conflict management processes:
Dramatic changes affecting economic, social and political systems throughout the world since the 1990’s have brought crisis and conflict to many countries. The magnitude and complexity of such changes have led to a loss of state legitimacy, increases in the numbers of failed States and a resurgence of ethnic violence. The drive hence is to initiate consensus-building efforts and by building national capacities to avoid, manage and mitigate crisis. A careful and sophisticated analysis of the many parties can, first of all, clarify the extent to which many of the parties need leadership and a few other parties with the requisite political leverage, to achieve what they want. This dependence of many groups on a handful leaders to achieve their goals, may help us narrow the playing field and key decision making process to responsible political accounting.
3.2.2.4.Citizenship should be seen as the cornerstone of life in the 21st Century.
It is the fundamental assertion of this dialogue starter think piece that citizenship education – learning about and appreciating one’s rights, duties, obligations and responsibilities as a citizen and the immediate rules, laws and governance structures within which Ethiopians exercise citizenship is the first and fundamental step in human security and development. Without it, it will make no significant headway neither with their new paradigms and strategies for development nor with the pendulous lurch towards democratic governance. At this level, all stakeholders must aim to increase the capacity of civic education and human rights institutions to perform effectively their functions as they relate to civic education and human rights promotion. Citizens’ action is an expression of both a basic human right and a responsibility to participate actively in the life of the community. Indeed, citizen action is one of the highest forms of citizenship as it represents service of the community.
Two intellectual traditions provide the theoretical framework within which the discussion is set on citizenship. It is a synthesis of conventional analysis of Ethiopian politics which attempts to deconstruct the contentions of previous sociological and anthropological analyses and re-interprets them within the problematic of state-society nexus. Characteristically it eschews a pre-determination of the locus of power in any of the public or private spheres. Otherwise, known as the political choice framework, it derives its theoretical leitmotif from the recognition of multiple factors at work on the Ethiopian political scene and by tracing their diverse dynamics over a period of time. Hence, any conflict management process must augur in the following meta-assumptions to be tested and indicators to be used in the peace strategy and mechanism development process (Oyugi, 2000).
3.2.3. Leadership:
Political leadership of the alliance of cultures has indeed an important role to play in setting the stage for inter-faith harmony. Similarly, this demands of our religious leaders’ intimate knowledge of public policy analysis, formulation and management and development of strategic directions for alliance and implementing them.
We can identify four main aspects
* analysis, formulation and management of policies, strategies and processes;
* obtaining policy consensus;
* ensuring that the public service and ancillary organizations can actually carry out the stated policy, and not see it subverted, neglected or undermined; and
* consistency and commitment: ensuring that policies are implemented with sufficient energy to actually work;
A commitment to achieving national development and promoting greater governance accountability, transparency and predictability will necessarily depend on an elaborate program directed at clear incentives for “behavioral change among civil servants and establish benchmarks against which to measure the impact of the reforms”, maintain strong coordination across tiers of government and ensure regional and wereda level focus. This would demand an independent review of the capacities of faith institutions: undertaking a systematic and independent review of the capacities of faith institutions at all levels.
3.3. Independent human quality development think tank:
Founding an independent human quality development think tank would be the single most powerful tool – investment in human qualities.
3.3.1. Reviewing the quality of religious teaching in human development:
The concept of education and learning throughout life has emerged as one of the key tools in the 21st century. Quality education has now become a lifelong necessity. This is augured by need to develop framework for education quality assurance, leadership and policy imperatives for guaranteeing the quality of education, education for democratic citizenship, the performance of the education system as a key element in economic development, empowerment and fourth generation of self-management. While trends show a resurgence of civil society movements, an important issue is the paradox broadly reproduced in the strengths and weaknesses of associative movements and the contestation that take place over social space, legitimacy, domination and resistance. Simply put, knowledge is the most valuable of strategic resources, and learning one of the most important capabilities for peace. A well-defined Knowledge management (KM) and networking strategy on using scarce resources for maximum impact to provides ample opportunities for cooperation.
3.3.2. Participation and the spiritual dimensions of resolving conflicts
The spiritual dimensions of human empowerment promote a fundamentally new value system based on justice, peace and the integrity of creation. It is a system that recognizes the rich resources of human communities, their cultural and spiritual contributions and the wealth of nature. It will be radically different from the value system on which the present economic and political orders are based and which lies behind the current crises like those of nuclear threat and industrial pollution. It is a new understanding of sharing in which those who have been marginalized by reason of sex, age, economic and political condition, ethnic origin and disability and identifying with the poor and oppressed and their organized movements in the struggle for justice and human dignity in church and society. The spiritual dimensions of human empowerment enables people to organize to realize their potential and power as individuals and communities. They work towards the kind of self-reliance and self-determination, which are an essential condition of interdependence. It is to be open to one another, as friends on the basis of common commitment, mutual trust and forgiveness, keeping one another informed of all plans and submitting ourselves to mutual accountability.
3.3.3. Shared values, vision and resources of community
This is a to a fundamentally new value system based on justice, peace and the integrity of humanity. To a new understanding of sharing in which those who have been marginalized to take their place at the center of all decisions and actions as equal partners and to identify with the poor and oppressed and their organized movements in the struggle for justice and human dignity in faith and society. These are demanding common tasks that build a community and the momentum for radical people’s participation: To bear witness to the mission of creation by identifying exposing and confronting at all levels the root causes, and the structures, of injustice which lead to the exploitation of the wealth and people of the third world and result in poverty and the destruction of creation. This entails working for a new economic and political order to enable people to organize themselves, realize their potential, and power as individuals and communities, working towards the kind of self-reliance and self-determination, which are an essential condition of interdependence (Spretnak, 1996).
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References & endnotes
*ACCORD, (1996) Alternative Conflict Management, (ACCORD, FAO, Rome)
*BBC, Kenyans hold vigil in Nairobi for Garissa victims, (2015)
*Bruton, Bronwyn E. (2010). Somalia: A New Approach. New York NP: Council on Foreign Relations.
*Costantinos, Berhutesfa. (2010) Stemming State Fragility, Failure and Collapse. A Human Security Perspective. Createspace: California, ISBN 978-1439276471
*FBI National Academy: Informed Leadership to Combat Terrorism, Course No. LDR 3910
*Fisseha Shawel (Unpublished). From Al-Itihad to Al-Shabbab. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, AA, 2008).
*Harmony Project (2006). Al-Qaida’s (Mis) Adventures in the Horn of Africa. Pentagon: WestPoint.
*ICPAT (2008). Terrorist Threats and Counter Terrorism Strategies in the IGAD sub-region. NP: IGAD.
*Gebre Gesesse, Muluwork, (2011) Trends Of And Responses To Terrorism In The Horn Of Africa: The Ethiopian Experience, IPSS, a Thesis Submitted for the MA Degree in Peace and Security
*Perl. Raphael F. (2006). CRS Issue Brief for congress received through the CRS web Terrorism and National Security: Issue and Trends. Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trend Division. city/publisher
*Osman, Abdurahman A. ‘Shuke’ (ND). Order Out of Chaos: Somali Customary Law in Puntland and Somaliland: NP: Accord
*Oyugi, Edward, (2000), Civil Society and Popular Participation in Development in Eastern Africa in Costantinos, Berhutesfa, (2000) Popular Participation in Political Decision making, UNECA.
*Spretnak, C., (1996) State of grace – the recovery of meaning in the postmodern age. Harper. San Francisco,).
*Tesfaye, Reta (2010). Terrorism and the Ethiopian Legal Response: the Need for New Anti-Terrorism Law. Addis Ababa University LLB Thesis.
*Webster’s English Dictionary (2003) G. & C. Meriam Company, Massachusetts.
*Wax, Emily. Five Truths about Darfur – (Washington Post, April 23, 2006; Kou Kou Angarana, Chad
*Weldeselassie Weldemichael (2004). International Terrorism and Its Horn of Africa Connections. EIIPD:Addis Ababa.
[i] In my travels, I’ve seen destroyed mosques all over Darfur. The strange thing, they said, was that the attackers were Muslim, too. Darfur is home to some of Sudan’s most devout Muslims”. Although the conflict has also been framed as a battle between Arabs and black Africans, everyone in Darfur appears dark-skinned. The true division in Darfur is between ethnic groups, split between herders and farmers. Each tribe gives itself the label of “African” or “Arab” based on what language its members speak and whether they work the soil or herd livestock. Also, if they attain a certain level of wealth, they call themselves Arab. Sudan melds African and Arab identities. As Arabs began to dominate the government in the past century and gave jobs to members of Arab tribes, being Arab became a political advantage; some tribes adopted that label regardless of their ethnic affiliation. More recently, rebels have described themselves as Africans fighting an Arab government. Ethnic slurs used by both sides in recent atrocities have riven communities that once lived together and intermarried. Who knows what the real bloodlines are in Darfur? Although analysts have emphasized the racial and ethnic aspects of the conflict in Darfur, a long-running political battle between Sudanese President Omar Hassan Bashir and radical Islamic cleric Hassan al-Turabi may be more relevant (Wax, 2005).
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*Public Lecture (based on Gebre Sellasse, Mulu, IPSS, 2011)
*Costantinos Berhutesfa Costantinos, PhD, Professor of Public Policy, School of Graduate Studies, College of Business & Economics, AAU
